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AUCTION THEORY AND STANDSTILLS:
DEALING WITH FRIENDS AND FOES IN A SALE
OF CORPORATE CONTROL
CHRISTINA M. SAUTTER∗

Abstract
A fundamental issue in Delaware mergers & acquisitions (M&A) law is the extent to which a target company’s
board of directors may restrict a sales process to extract
value from bidders and grant a “winning bidder” certain
deal protections to protect a transaction from being overbid. Standstill agreements are one such form of deal protection. Standstills prevent bidders from making or announcing a bid for the target without the target’s consent
both during the sales process and for a period after the
sales process is completed and the target has executed an
agreement with a “winning bidder.” Recent 2011 and
2012 Delaware Court of Chancery rulings have placed a
new spotlight on the use of standstill agreements in M&A
∗ Cynthia Felder Fayard Associate Professor of Law,
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center.
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deals and specifically in change of control transactions.
In particular, these cases highlight the restrictiveness of
some standstills and open up discussion as to how restrictive a standstill may be without violating a target company board of directors’ duty to maximize stockholder value.
This Article makes a unique contribution because it is
the first paper to apply auction theory in critiquing and
evaluating the need for standstills in M&A transactions.
Auction theory utilizes economics to design optimal bidding procedures and revenue-enhancing auctions. The
application of auction theory to standstills is particularly
well suited as the execution of a standstill is often cited as
resulting in increased value during the sales process. Using auction theory and recent Delaware case law as a
foundation, this Article provides a new framework for the
use of standstills. It argues that to the extent standstills
provide an entry into the due diligence and general sales
processes, standstills may help to enhance value. Moreover, the promise of standstill restrictions continuing postsigning may aid in incentivizing bidders to submit their
highest offers during the pre-signing sale process. But
the use of more restrictive standstills like those in which
a bidder agrees not to request a waiver and a target
agrees in advance not to waive a standstill (or Don’t Ask,
Don’t Waive (DADW) standstills) should turn on whether
strategic or financial bidders are involved in the process
as well as the amount of pre-signing shopping of the target engaged in by the board. This Article provides a new
framework for dealmakers and for courts taking into consideration those factors. Among other things, this framework suggests that if dealmakers are to continue their use
of DADW standstills, that they be paired with a minimal
fiduciary out and with a staggered termination fee.
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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental tension in mergers and acquisitions law
exists between a selling company’s board of directors’ duty
to maximize stockholder value in a sale of control and the
board’s ability to restrict the sales process and grant a
“winning bidder” certain covenants to protect the transaction from being overbid.1 Standstill agreements are one
such way the board of a selling company, the target, restricts the sales process and discourages overbids.2 In
particular, standstills prevent bidders who are participating in the sales process from making or announcing a bid
for the target without the target’s consent both during the
sales process and for a period after the process is complet-

See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (describing a board of
directors as "auctioneers charged with getting the best
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company"); Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938
(Del. 2003) (describing board of directors’ authority to
grant deal protection to a “winning bidder”).
2
The target and its financial advisor generally require
auction participants execute a confidentiality agreement
before gaining access to the target’s nonpublic information. Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, Strategic & Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions (2010)
available
at
(manuscript
at
7),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=15594
81. The standstill can be a separate standalone document
or, more typically, appears as a provision in the confidentiality agreement. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v.
Vulcan Materials Co., 2012 WL 2783101, at *8 n.43 (Del.
July 10, 2012). The terms standstill, standstill agreement, and standstill provision will be used interchangeably in this Article.
1

5
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ed and the target has executed an agreement with a
“winning” bidder.3
Standstills help the target to control the sales process
and ensure bidders do not preempt the process by making
offers directly to the target’s stockholders or by otherwise
bidding before the target is ready to receive offers.4
Moreover, pre-signing, standstills may help a board to
satisfy its duty to maximize stockholder value, or its
Revlon duties, as standstills may “provide the [target
board] leverage to extract concessions from the parties
who seek to make a bid.”5 Because most standstills do not
expire upon the target’s execution of a definitive agreement with a “winning” bidder, most standstills are intended to prevent later overbidding between the signing
and closing of the contemplated transaction (the pre-

Martin Marietta, 2012 WL 2783101, at *8.
William G. Lawlor, Taming the Tiger: Difficult Standstill Agreement Issues for Targets, 7, 7 (July-Aug. 2007),
published
in
Deal
Lawyers,
available
at
3

4

http://www.dechert.com/library/C&SLawlorTamingtheTiger.pdf. (providing standstills “provide[] a
stable environment in which the sale process can be managed and controlled by the target.”).
5 In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del.
Ch. 2007).. In a 2011 case dealing with a standstill waiver, Chancellor Strine reiterated this view saying,
I mean, it is pretty well understood that part
of what you can do as a first-in bidder who is
actually binding yourself to buy a company is
get some deal protections that insure that,
you know, you won’t be topped lightly; that
there aren’t free riders; and then make the
target board make certain determinations
before they get out of a merger agreement.
In re Transatlantic Holdings, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ.
Action Nos. 6574-CS & 6776-CS, 22 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22,
2011).
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closing period).6 In this way, targets and winning bidders
use standstills as a form of deal protection device preclosing. For these reasons, standstills have been called
“the [mergers and acquisitions] equivalent of a schoolyard
‘time-out.’”7 In other words, standstills keep friendly bidders friendly and prevent those bidders from becoming
foes either to the target or to the winning bidder. Despite
the intended benefits of standstills, like any deal protection device, standstills are not without drawbacks. Because a target board’s Revlon duties do not end at the execution of a definitive agreement but instead continue until the stockholders vote on the proposed transaction,
standstills potentially hinder the board from complying

Christina M. Sautter, Promises Made to be Broken?
Standstill Agreements in Change of Control Transactions,
6

37 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at
982),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=20208
28 (describing the conflict that exists between a board’s
duty to maximize stockholder value and its ability to
grant deal protection provisions); Robert E. Spatt, The

Four Ring Circus-Round Sixteen; A Further Updated
View of the Mating Dance Among Announced Merger
Partners and an Unsolicited Second or Third Bidder, 40
(Feb.
17,
2012),
available
at
http://www.stblaw.com/google_file.cfm?TrackedFile=4B46
116604D6E9D896B179&TrackedFolder=585C1D235281A
ED996A07D5F9F9478AB5A90188899 (discussing intended goal of standstills is to prevent deal jumping).

Proxy Battle Time-Out:
Breather,
7

Standstills Give Boards a

http://currents.westlawbusiness.com/Articles/2009/07/200
90731_0005.aspx?cid=&src= (April 9, 2009); Lawlor, supra note 4, at 7.
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with its Revlon duties.8 More specifically, standstills prevent bidders from making overbids and may prevent
boards from considering overbids even if the overbid provides more value than the deal with the “winning bidder.”9 Moreover, there is always a risk a target board
may use a standstill to improperly favor one bidder over
another or to otherwise entrench itself in office.10
Recently, the Delaware courts have issued several decisions commenting on the restrictiveness of some standstills and their potential interference in the satisfaction of
a board’s Revlon duties.11 As a result, there has been a
STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOGOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 236 (2009) (explaining that under Revlon a target
“must keep itself up for sale . . . up to the shareholder vote
on the transaction”); Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 938 (“The directors of a Delaware corporation have a continuing obligation to discharge their fiduciary responsibilities, as future circumstances develop, after a merger agreement is
announced.”).
9 In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., Civ. Action No. 6304VCP, 54 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) (describing board’s inability to consider higher offers made by bidder who is subject to a standstill); see also Paul Povel & Rajdeep Singh,
Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders, 19 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1399, 1402 (2006) (“[Deal protection] devices make
the target less attractive to rejected bidders, thereby reducing their incentive to top up the winning bid.”).
10 Topps, 926 A.2d at 91.
11
See, e.g., Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 2012 WL 2783101 (Del. July 10, 2012); In
re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS
(Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012); In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig.,
Civ. Action No. 6304-VCP (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012); In re
Rehabcare Group, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011); In re Topps Co. S’holders
Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007).
8

VERS,
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9

surge in the attention being paid to standstills by practitioners.12 But, to date, scholars have yet to address the
dichotomy standstills raise between aiding and hindering
value maximization. I have previously touched upon this
dichotomy by using past Delaware case law to analyze
how the Delaware courts are likely to address particularly

See, e.g., Steven M. Haas, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive”
Standstill Agreements under Attack, 26 INSIGHTS 29
(Dec. 2012); Sarkis Jebejian & Daniel E. Wolf, An Ounce
of Prevention – Some Guidance for Target Boards, Kirkland M&A Update, 2 (Jan. 14, 2013), available at
12

http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/MAUpda
te_011413.pdf; Trevor S. Norwitz, Igor Kirman, & William Savitt, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive Standstills” Revisited (Rapidly), CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 9, 2013), availa-

ble

at

http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/01/09/dont-askdont-waive-standstills-revisited-rapidly/; William Savitt,
Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive Standstills, THE HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Dec. 18, 2012, 8:51 a.m.), available at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/18/dontask-dont-waive-standstills/; Gary E. Thompson & Steven
M. Haas, The State of M&A Standstills In Delaware,
Hunton & Williams Client Alert (Jan. 2013), available at
http://www.hunton.com/files/News/b91c8716-e69d-4ef1b510c3810f99af9d/Presentation/NewsAttachment/ee1368dafab8-489e-9652c3a423539c68/DE_MA_Standstill_Agreements.pdf; Peter
J. Walsh, Jr., Janine M. Salomone, & David B. DiDonato,

Delaware Insider: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” Standstill
Provisions: Impermissible Limitation on Director Fiduciary Obligations or Legitimate, Value-Maximizing Tool?,
2013 Jan. Bus. L. Today 1.
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restrictive standstills.13 My analysis assumed, however,
the continued existence of standstills as they are currently being utilized in most mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
transactions and did not address the fundamental issues
of the extent to which boards may use standstills to restrict the sales process or protect an executed deal.14 This
Article addresses these fundamental issues by applying
auction theory to critique and evaluate the role of standstills in M&A transactions. Auction theory utilizes economics to design optimal bidding procedures and revenueenhancing sales processes. The application of auction
theory to standstills is particularly well suited as targets
require the execution of standstills based on the theory
that standstills help to increase value during the sales
process. Despite dealmaker’ assumption that standstills
are revenue enhancing scholars have not used auction
theory to examine standstills and test this assumption
until now.
In applying auction theory to standstills, this Article
makes a unique contribution to M&A legal scholarship by
providing answers to some fundamental questions presented by every sale of corporate control. Part I of this
Article describes auction theory as it relates to the M&A
sales process. Part II details a target board’s fiduciary
duties in the context of a sale of corporate control and explores the typical sales processes used by public companies. Part III details Delaware cases addressing the need
for and possible enforcement of various standstills. Part

See generally Sautter, supra note 6. In Promises Made
to be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, I specifically address a target board’s

13

ability to consider a third party superior offer made in
contravention of a standstill; a board’s promise not to
waive a standstill; and a board’s ability to grant a “winning” bidder the right to enforce a previously executed
standstill against a “losing” bidder. See id.
14 Id. at manuscript at 60.
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IV uses auction theory and recent Delaware cases to develop a new framework for dealmakers and courts, taking
into consideration whether strategic or financial bidders
are involved in the sales process as well as the amount of
pre-signing shopping done by the target board. Among
other things, this new framework suggests that if
dealmakers are to continue using certain more restrictive
standstills, that they pair them with a minimal fiduciary
out and staggered termination fee.
I. AUCTION THEORY & STANDSTILLS
There is a substantial body of literature on auction
theory generally and an increasing amount of literature
on auction theory in the M&A context. Little of this literature specifically focuses on deal protection devices and
none of it specifically addresses the use of standstills in
the auction process. This Article addresses this gap and
uses auction theory to propose a new framework for the
use of standstills in change of control transactions.
Academics have used auction theory to attempt to design sales processes that produce optimal revenue maximizing auctions.15 Auction theory is developing rapidly and
is increasingly being looked to for assistance in practical
applications, but current auction theory is by no means
complete.16 One practical application that may have the
greatest impact is in the M&A field, which undoubtedly
contains one of the largest markets for auctions. Given
the size of any typical M&A transaction and corporate fiduciary duties, there are few areas that could benefit
more from an optimal sales process. If auction theory
could be used to design optimal auctions in M&A transactions, then the outcome of the auction should be able to be

See generally Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide
to the Literature, 13 J. ECON. SURVEY 227 (1999) (discuss15

ing optimal auction design).
16 Id. at 248.
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controlled largely through the structure of the sales process. If designing an optimal sales process for any given
intricate M&A transaction seems too good to be true at
this point, it is because many factors can impact the results of any given auction.17
A. Common Value versus Private Value Sales Process-

es
One of the many factors impacting the ultimate results
of a sales process is the type of bidders involved.18 When
financial buyers are the bidders in an auction, academics
tend to define those auctions as common value auctions.19
A common value auction is an auction in which all of the
participants have the same or very similar value for the
target.20 This is the case with financial buyers because
they “can exploit the same sources of gains (e.g., cost cutting, financial restructuring).”21 Conversely, a private
value auction is one in which each bidder has a certain
value it is willing to pay but is not aware of the value other bidders are willing to pay.22 Strategic, or trade, buyers
are often interested in acquiring a target company to optimize possible unique synergies between the buyer and
the target.23 Thus, strategic buyers tend to have differing

See id. at 234-47 (discussing many factors that impact
auctions).
18 Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1399.
19 Jeremy Bulow, Ming Huang, & Paul Klemperer, Toeholds and Takeovers, 107 J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 427, 427
(1999).
20 J. Russel Denton, Note, Stacked Deck: Go-Shops and
Auction Theory, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1535 (2008).
21 Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400.
22 Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICS 1089,
1090 (1982).
23 Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400.
17
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values for a target based on the value each individual
strategic buyer places on those particular synergies.24
Therefore, auction processes involving strategic bidders
tend to be private value auctions.25 In addition, if the
target’s management has teamed up with a financial buyer to engage in a management-led buyout (“MBO”) then
the MBO team likely has better information regarding the
target’s value than the typical financial buyer.26 In such
case, the bidding process would be more similar to the
private value auction.
The types of bidders involved in an auction impacts the
auction results because strategic and financial bidders
tend to value targets “in systematically different ways.”27
Generally, strategic bidders are more likely to pay more
“for smaller targets that have substantial internal cash
reserves and that undertake significant research and development activities.”28 Conversely, financial bidders are
more likely to pay more relative to market value for underperforming companies and “are insensitive” to other
factors like the target’s size.29
The differing valuations between strategic and financial bidders arise from the differences in information
within and between these general types of bidders who
“are not always equally well informed” as well as from the
type of information upon which each group tends to rely.30
In fact, “a key feature of auctions is the presence of
asymmetric information. (With perfect information most

24
25
26
27
28
29

Denton, supra note 20, at 1535.
Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400.
Id. at 1399.
Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 2, manuscript at 4.

Id.
Id.

Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400; Gorbenko &
Malenko, supra note 2, manuscript at 4.
30
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auction models are relatively easy to solve).”31 Of course,
strategic bidders and buyers engaged in an MBO have
asymmetric information because each bidder uses their
own private information to value the object of the auction.32 That is, these types of bidders have superior information on the target either due to their status as insiders or due to how they value the company based on
particular synergies. In fact, strategic bidders “are less
tied to publicly observable characteristics” like financial
statements or market indicators so that the end result is
that each strategic bidder’s valuation of the target is
“unique.”33
Financial bidders can also have asymmetric information.34 While their actual value of the object is the
same, at least theoretically after the fact, each bidder has
different private information about what the value actually is.35 For example, in the case of a corporation, while
the value of the underlying assets should produce the
same returns for any financial buyer in the long run, the
bidder’s valuation estimates of those future returns may
differ.
But, as Professors Alexander Gorbenko and
Andrey Malenko explain in their manuscript, Strategic
and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions, financial
bidders’ valuations tend to be based “on observable factors, captured by the information about the targets available from the market and financial statements.”36 Thus,
the end result is that, unlike strategic bidders, financial

Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 J. ECON. SURVEY 227, 248, 229 (1999).
32 Denton, supra note 237, at 1535.
33 Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 2, manuscript at 4.
34 See Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1405 (stating that
financial bidders may nevertheless have superior information).
35 Klemperer, supra note 15, at 229-30.
36 Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 2, manuscript at 4.
31
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bidders’ valuations “tend to be similar to each other and
rather exchangeable from a target’s point of view.”37
Even granting these distinctions in the real world of
dealmaking, the classification of one type of auction as a
pure common value one or a pure private value one is not
necessarily accurate. Actual bidders rarely have identical
valuations for an auctioned object nor are their valuations
completely uncorrelated.38 As Professor Subramanian
recognized in his book, Negotiauctions, “[e]ven with a
seemingly pure private-value asset, there is a significant
common-value element.”39 Thus, information will not be
perfectly symmetric between all buyers because, even if
they are all using the same information about the target
company, each bidder evaluates that information differently. In these situations involving asymmetric bidders,
Professors Povel and Singh argue that “more biased procedures” should be used in the sale process, including deal
protection devices.40
B. Information in the Sales Process
The unique interpretation of information each bidder
brings to the sales table impacts the question of whether
standstills enhance the bidding process. This uniqueness
is especially relevant because, as discussed above, standstills are inextricably tied to the provision of information.
Numerous auction theorists have explored the role of information in the sales process. Professors Bulow and
Klemperer have found that “contrary to our usual instinct
that auctions are profitable because they are efficient, it is
37

Id.

Peter Crampton & Allen Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
27, 29 (1991).
39 GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, NEGOTIAUCTIONS 93 (2010).
40 Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1417.
38

15
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precisely the inefficiency of the auction – that entry into it
is relatively ill-informed and therefore leads to a more
random outcome – that makes it more profitable for the
seller.”41 Once bidders have entered the auction, Professors Boone and Mulherin have found there is a fine line
targets must walk in revealing proprietary information to
bidders. In particular, receiving proprietary information
causes bidders to be more certain about their valuation of
the company and in turn causes bidders to bid more.42 At
the same time, however, a target’s provision of confidential information can “reduce the inherent value of the selling firm” because losing bidders can “gain competitive advantages.”43 As a result, a seller’s management of the
sales process to limit the number and kind of bidders and
otherwise manage the process to reduce information costs
can “actually create value.”44
Some have argued, based on the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem or the logic of marginal revenue versus marginal
cost, that even by taking into account asymmetric information an optimal auction, in theory, can be created.45
This particular theorem states that the auction type does
not influence the revenue produced by an auction regardless of the information each bidder has.46 Under the theorem, “all the ‘standard’ auctions . . . yield the same ex41
42

Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 59, at 1546.
Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Is There One

Best Way to Sell a Company? Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled Sales, 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 28,
33 (2009).
43 Id.; see also Auctions in the M&A Process, FINANCIER
WORLDWIDE
(Nov.
2007);
available
at

http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Auctions_in_the_M%
26A_Process.pdf. (“The seller in an auction risks opening
itself up to tactical investigation by competitors.”).
44 Id. at 28.
45 Klemperer, supra note 15, at 232-33.
46 Id. at 232.

2013]

AUCTION THEORY & STANDSTILLS

pected revenue under the stated conditions, as do many
non-standard auctions.”47 However, this theory “applies
very generally,” and rests on a number of assumptions,
including that bidders are risk neutral; that bidders’ private information is independent of competitors’ private
information; and that bidders’ private values are drawn
from a common distribution.48 But, more recent developments have suggested that standard auctions cannot be
optimal in the presence of bidder asymmetry, and an increase in bidder asymmetry can hurt the seller if it uses a
standard auction.49
Even if optimal auctions could be created by varying
these assumptions50, many other factors can influence the
outcome of an auction that most models have not been extended to completely account for.51 These factors include
the entry costs and number of bidders; ability of bidders
to collude; and the divisibility of the unit for sale in the
auction (or multi-unit auctions).52 The idea of a multiunit auction or the divisibility of a business into separate
units is generally not examined in auction theory literature. 53 However, this singular focus may be misplaced
when using auction literature to interpret M&A transactions because of the large indivisible number of assets
comprising a business. Of the literature that does focus
47
48

Id.
Id.

Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1403.
See Klemperer, supra note 15, at 234-36 (finding generally that optimal auction can be created in some cases
regardless of assumptions).
51 See id. at 238-47 (discussing implications of various
factors on results of Revenue Equivalence Theorem making creation of efficient optimal auctions difficult).
52 Id. at 238-47.
53 Id. at 240 (“Most auction theory . . . restricts attention
to the sale of a single indivisible unit.”).
49

50
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on multi-unit auctions, the “main message . . . is that it is
very hard to achieve efficient outcomes.”54 Furthermore,
most existing auction literature only allows for the case of
either private value or common value bidding environments, that is, an auction that only contains either financial or strategic buyers, but not both.55 But the likelihood
of the presence of such distinct classifications is not realistic.
Nonetheless, at least one proposal has been made by
Professors Povel and Singh setting forth a “simple and realistic” optimal selling procedure to incorporate these
asymmetries that could be particularly applicable to M&A
transactions.56 This sequential selling procedure model
“requires commitment to its rules, and deal protection devices [to] help the target cement this commitment.”57 At
the same time commitment to the rules in a M&A sales
process may be too much to hope for. As Professor
Subramanian has pointed out,
Auctions in the real world are messy. The
rules are unclear and constantly changing.
Price is just one of the many terms to be decided. The seller is not a passive participant
after establishing the rules of the game. All
of these real-world factors violate the fundamental assumptions on which much of
auction theory is based.
In the present state of auction theory, even if Professors
Povel and Singh’s model allowed for an optimal selling
procedure, it could not do so alone. Some other structural
protection device would be needed to ensure the best bidding process.
C. Standstills in the Sales Process
54

Id. at 243.

55

Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400.

56

Id.
Id. at 1425.

57
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One structural protection device used in the vast majority of sales is the standstill. Standstills generally prevent potential buyers from engaging in activity that may
be considered hostile to the target.58 More specifically, “a
standstill agreement will prohibit a hostile bid in any
form, including a tender offer to acquire stock control of
the other contracting party and/or a proxy contest to replace all or some of its directors.”59 Although standstills
can be standalone agreements, most appear as a provision
in a confidentiality agreement. Despite the close affiliation between standstill agreements and confidentiality
agreements, the two agreements serve vitally different
functions.60 More specifically, the confidentiality agreement is intended to prevent the use or disclosure of nonpublic information whereas the standstill is intended to
regulate the manner in which a party may gain control
over the target.61 Along these lines, “[s]tandstill prohibitions do not require, or in any way, depend upon, a contracting party’s use or disclosure of the other party’s confidential nonpublic information.”62 At the same time, the
main purpose of including a standstill in a confidentiality
agreement is to prevent “the buyer [from] hav[ing] an informational advantage over other prospective bidders resulting from its review of confidential information.”63
Along these lines, standstills give “teeth” to confidentiality agreements which alone may not be enough to estab-

Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials
Co., 2012 WL 2783101, at *8 (Del. July 10, 2012).
58

59
60
61
62

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 157 (3d.
2011).

63
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lish insider trading liability under current federal securities laws.64
Standstills have been described as the “cost of entry”
into discussions with a target.65 In fact, some, if not most,
targets will refuse to proceed with negotiations if the bidder refuses to execute the standstill.66 The standstill
“serves as a kind of litmus test, an indication of a bidder’s
true intentions.”67 A bidder can “try to modify the standstill as much as [it] can” but by executing the standstill

Ryan M. Davis, Note, Trimming the “Judicial Oak”:
Rule 10b5-2(B)(1), Confidentiality Agreements, and the
Proper Scope of Insider Trading Liability, 63 VAND. L.

64

REV. 1469, 1486 (2010) (“[This Note] finds that liability
cannot be based on confidentiality agreements alone, for
although the [United States] Supreme Court has been
willing to stretch the duty requirement in the past, the
Court has always required more than a duty to keep information in confidence.”).
65
Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L. J. 621, 660 (2003).
66 See Nicole E. Clark, Preliminary Agreements, in DOING
DEALS 2009: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS & BOLTS OF
TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE, at 80-81 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Grp., Course Handbook Series No. 18777, 2009) (stating target generally asks bidder to execute standstill in
exchange for confidential information); Meryl S. Rosenblatt, Letters of Intent and Exclusivity, Confidentiality
and Standstill Agreements, in DRAFTING CORPORATE
AGREEMENTS 2002-2003, at 237 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice
Grp., Course Handbook Series No. B0-01K0, 2002-2003)
(noting target may require standstill to ensure buyer remains committed to transaction and to prevent buyer
from pursuing hostile alternative).
67 BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 689 (2000).
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the bidder is forsaking its “ability to launch an unsolicited
offer.”68
Because standstills work to restrict bidders, the length
of these restrictions can become a significant issue during
negotiations. Typically, “auction-style standstill agreements last only one or two years, on the basis that the
confidential information to be provided to the bidders will
have useful currency for only a relatively short time.”69
Standstills can be longer than a year, even up to five
years, but generally, standstills “with expirations between
six months and one year are not uncommon; although,
one year may be the norm.”70 For example, one commonly
negotiated aspect of a standstill is whether the standstill
will include a fall-away provision. One practitioner described a fall-away provision as an “escape hatch” for a
buyer.71 A fall-away provision provides the standstill restrictions would no longer apply if another bidder not
bound by a standstill makes an offer for the target or if
the target executes a definitive acquisition agreement
with another bidder.72 A target may resist this provision
fearing it may prevent the bidder from submitting its best
offer during the pre-signing sales process.73 But targets
68
69
70

Subramanian, supra note 70, at 662.
Lawlor, supra note 4, at 11.
Sautter, supra note 6, manuscript at 22-23.

Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies in Transactions Structured as Friendly Tender Offers, 116 PENN
71

ST. L. REV. 615, 636 (2012).
72

Id.

William Savitt, Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive Standstills,
The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance
and Financial Regulation (Dec. 18, 2012, 8:51 a.m.),
73

available

at

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/18/dont-askdont-waive-standstills/ (“Sellers usually resist fall-aways
both to prevent bidders from holding back and to induce
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often end up agreeing to the fall-away as a way of moving
along the sales process.74 Moreover, targets recognize the
possibility may provide more value ultimately.75 Nevertheless, some practitioners argue that whether a target
should agree to a fall-away standstill is context specific.76
For example, if the target has decided that it is definitely
for sale and “is going to run a process that’s definitely going to end in a sale” a target may be more willing to agree
to a fall-away.77 As is evident from the foregoing, whether
a standstill falls away is often a matter of some debate.
Another matter of some debate among practitioners is
the viability and enforceability of Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive
(or “DADW”) standstills. These standstills prevent a potential bidder who had executed a standstill from requesting a waiver of the standstill
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND M&A SALE PROCESSES
In analyzing standstills and their related sub provisions, auction theory cannot be considered in a vacuum,
as there are other significant considerations in the context
of a sale of a publicly traded, Delaware corporation.
Namely, a well-developed body of Delaware case law governing a target board’s fiduciary duties significantly influences such sales. Moreover, there is the practical consideration regarding the processes by which targets actuthem, by promising certainty, to put their best offer on
the table.”).

Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies in
Transactions Structured as Friendly Tender Offers, 116
74

PENN ST. L. REV. 615, 636 (2012).
Id. (“At the end of the day, if you have what you think
is the highest price in an auction, it’s not a bad thing that
[the bidder] wants to come in and put more money on the
table.”)

75

76
77

Id.
Id.
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ally go about selling themselves. This section first details
the fiduciary duties applicable to a target board’s actions
in a sale of corporate control. Then the following sections
describe the various sales methods upheld by Delaware
courts and available to a target board. The role of standstills in each sale method is emphasized.
A. Fiduciary Duties in a Sale of Corporate Control
The seminal Delaware Supreme Court case of Revlon v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. provides that once a
sale of corporate control becomes inevitable, “a board’s
primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer responsible
for selling the company to the highest bidder.”78 Since
this holding the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized
that “no single blueprint exists” for a board to satisfy its
Revlon duties.79 The courts have acknowledged that not
every sale requires a full-blown auction process but rather
the board of directors of a selling corporation must meet
“a reasonableness standard.”80 Moreover, in selecting an
acquirer and in rejecting other offers, boards are not
bound to make that decision solely based on the price being offered. Instead, the target board may consider a variety of factors, including the offer terms and feasibility,
financing, the likelihood of consummation of the proposed
transaction, and “the bidder's identity, prior background

Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
79 Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286
(Del. 1989).
80 Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, C.A. No. 5878-VCL at
6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2011); see also Barkan, 567 A.2d at
1286 (“Revlon does not demand that every change in the
control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated
bidding contest.”).
78

23

24

AUCTION THEORY & STANDSTILLS

and other business venture experiences.”81 Just because a
company is in Revlon-mode, does not prevent a target’s
board “from offering bidders deal protections, so long as
its decision to do so was reasonably directed to the objective of getting the highest price, and not” a self-dealing
goal “to tilt the playing field towards a particular bidder
for reasons unrelated to the stockholders' ability to get top
dollar.”82
B. M&A Sales Processes
The Delaware courts have upheld a variety of sale
methods as meeting the reasonableness standard. This
section explores the typical sales methods used in a sale of
corporate control and upheld by the Delaware courts: a
classic public auction, pre-signing market canvass, negotiated acquisition, and post-signing market checks. Although this Article addresses each of these sale methods
on an individual basis, many targets may use a combination of two or more of these methods in any one transaction.

1. Classic Full-Blown Auction
The classic full-blown auction is generally thought to
be the easiest way for a board to ensure satisfaction of its
fiduciary duties pre-signing.83 Not only is a classic aucMills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1282 n.29 (Del. 1988).
82 In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holders Litig., 877 A.2d 975,
1000-01 (Del. Ch. 2005).
83
See WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 746 (“A wideranging auction generally maximizes value, particularly
since the ‘best buyer’ on paper is not always the party who
eventually pays the highest price.”); Samuel C. Thompson, § 5:5 The Delaware Law Governing Fiduciary Duties
in M&A, in MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND TENDER OFFERS,
81
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tion thought to be the easiest way to prove compliance
with fiduciary duties but, as Professors Jeremy Bulow
and Paul Klemperer found in a recent study, “the
straightforward, level-playing-field competition that an
auction creates is usually more profitable for a seller than
a sequential process.”84 However, in another study of 400
takeovers of U.S. corporations during the 1990s, Professors Audra Boone and Harold Mulherin found that there
were not substantial differences between the wealth effects resulting from auctions versus those resulting from
negotiations.85 Despite finding that auctions were not
5-201 (PLI April, 2012) (recognizing best way to sell publicly held companies may be through “active and fair auction[s]” and stating “[a]ctual market testing through an
auction may be more beneficial than relying solely on investment bankers to assess valuation”); Auctions in the
M&A Process, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2007); avail-

able
at
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Auctions_in_the_M%
26A_Process.pdf. (“The basics of what sellers are looking
for in an auction remain the same: maximum price, high
certainty of completing the transaction and management’s
preferred buyer.”). See also Christina M. Sautter, Shop-

ping During Extended Store Hours: From No Shops to
Go-Shops – The Development, Effectiveness, and Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of Control Transactions, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 525 at 576 (2008) (hereinafter,
“Go-Shops”) (noting Delaware courts consider public auctions or pre-signing targeted market canvasses to be value maximization procedures).
84
Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Why Do Sellers
(Usually) Prefer Auctions?, 99 AMER. ECON. REV. 1544,
1545 (2009).
85 Audra L. Boone & Harold Mulherin, How are Firms
Sold?, LXII J. OF FINAN. 847, 871 (2007) (hereinafter, How
are Firms Sold?).
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necessarily better at maximizing stockholder value as negotiations, Boone and Mulherin found that half of the 400
takeovers studied result from an auction process.86 Thus,
the auction process is certainly a popular form of sale
even if business scholars debate whether it is more beneficial to stockholders than negotiations.
Generally, the auction begins with the preparation of
an offering memorandum describing in detail the target’s
business.87 At the same time the offering memorandum is
being prepared, the target’s financial advisor devises a
list of potential purchasers.88 The financial advisor then
contacts the potential purchasers and those potential
buyers who express a potential interest in the target are
required to execute a confidentiality agreement before being given the offering memorandum and, in some cases,
other information.89 In most deals, the confidentiality
agreement will contain a standstill.90 Thus, auction participants enter the auction process without first determining the value of the company and without knowing what
other bidders will bid.91 It is this lack of knowledge that
86

Id. at 869.

WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 746.
Id. at 746; see also Robert G. Hansen, Auctions of
Companies, 39 ECON. INQUIRY 30, 30 (2001) (stating that
potential bidder list likely includes “competitors, suppliers, customers, and acquisition oriented conglomerates or
leveraged buyout houses”).
89 WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 746.

87
88

Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies in
Transactions Structured as Friendly Tender Offers, 116
90

PENN ST. L. REV. 615, 636 (2012) (stating confidentiality
agreements typically contain standstill provisions).
91 Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 59, at 1545. As prominent investment banker, Bruce Wasserstein, explained,
“[t]he auction format naturally creates tension-especially
the blind auction in which bidders are not told how many
other parties they are competing against. . . . If the auc-
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Professors Bulow and Klemperer contend enhance value
maximization in an auction.92
At a predetermined date pursuant to the target’s bidding procedures, the interested bidders are required to
submit a preliminary, nonbinding indication of interest.93
These indications of interest “will either be a number or
range of numbers that are supposed to represent bidders’
first approximations of their estimates of value of the target.’”94 The target and its financial advisor usually then
narrow the field of bidders based on the prices contained
in the indications of interests and other factors.95 At this
point, the narrowed field of bidders is asked to participate

tioneer is able and the integrity of the process is maintained, even a single bidder can be induced to enter a ‘full’
bid.” WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 748 (emphasis added).
92
Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 59, at 1546
(“[C]ontrary to our usual instinct that auctions are profitable because they are efficient, it is precisely the ineffi-

ciency of the auction – that entry into it is relatively illinformed and therefore leads to a more random outcome –
that makes it more profitable for the seller.”) (emphasis in
original) ); see also Afra Afsharipour, A Shareholders' Put
Option: Counteracting the Acquirer Overpayment Problem, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1018, 1041 (2012) (“First, since a
target's real value is unknown at the time of the acquisition, ‘habitually optimistic therefore likely to overestimate
a target's value.’ Second, managers may overpay because
they are ignorant of bidding theory and are vulnerable to
the ‘winner's curse.’ Thus, on average, for an asset whose
value is unknown, the winning bid is the one that overestimates the value of the asset.”).
93 WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 746.
94 Hansen, supra note 20, at 31.
95 WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 747.
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in a second round of bidding.96 This is usually the point
at which the target’s management will hold presentations
for the bidders, the bidders will receive access to either an
online or physical data room to perform due diligence, and
plant or site visits will occur.97 In some cases, bidders
will be expected to complete due diligence review before
final bids are submitted.98 Thus, the final bids will not be
subject to satisfactory completion of due diligence.99 In
addition, the target will send the final bidders a sample
purchase agreement that the final bidders will mark-up
and return with their offers on the final bid date.100
The auction winner is chosen based in large part on
the offer price but other factors, including the purchase
agreement mark-up, can play a significant role.101 For
example, financing, antitrust issues, closing certainty,
and reverse termination fees are just some of the factors
that targets may consider in choosing an auction win-

96
97
98
99

Id.
Id.; Hansen, supra note 20, at 31.
WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 747.
See id. (noting that in certain instances bid winner is

announced on final bid date).
100
101

Id.
See id. (stating “[p]rice often is the determining factor

in an auction” and differentiating between bidders who
have submitted “unfavorable contract” versus bidders who
have submitted “’clean’” contract). But see Jack & Suzy
Welch, Why Joe Biden is Wrong About Private Equity Execs, FORTUNE, JULY 2, 2012, at 42 (“Usually several firms
are vying for the business, but it’s not accurate to assume
that price is the sole determinant of who wins. Just as
critical many times is a PE firm’s ability to bring contentious stakeholders to a shared vision of the future. The
result is that private equity managers are experienced in
the art of getting tough deals done.”).
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ner.102 Generally, these auctions are “sealed-bid” auctions, meaning that the bidders do not know the terms of
the other bidders’ bids and the final bids remain final.103
However, some auctions are “dripping wax” auctions in
which the purportedly final bids are not actually final.104
In such an auction, the “seller goes back to the few highest bidders, with the high bid used as leverage over the
others in an attempt to force a raise. If successful, the
new prices can be used against the former high bidder.”105
As Wasserstein has noted the success of an auction
depends in large part on how the auction is run with an
emphasis on the selective release of information during
the auction process.106 Although the information provided
to bidders in the offering memorandum and through due
diligence “is extensive, it is not complete.”107 Thus, bidders will likely have asymmetric information largely
based on how the bidders interpret the information provided to them in the due diligence period as well as based
on the pre-existing information already in their possession.

See In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 72 (listing such elements
as reasons to deny Upper Deck continued friendly negotiations); see also WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 747
(“[O]ne bidder may offer a high price, an unfavorable contract, and no concrete details regarding financing. Another bidder might be willing to pay less, but offer a ‘clean’
contract and quick closure.”).
103 WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 747.
102

104
105
106

Id.
Id.
See id. at 748 (“If the process is managed correctly,

bidders will be pulled along by the desire for more data.”).
107 Hansen, supra note 20, at 32. As Professor Hansen
states, “Throughout the auction process, potential buyers
may ask for information that the selling company will
view as too confidential to reveal.” Id.
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Although some scholars view public auctions as the
best way to maximize stockholder value, there are certainly situations in which a public auction is not desirable. One such situation is when a board views an auction
as placing the company at a competitive disadvantage.108
For example, if a company conducts a public auction, the
company risks losing employees, customers, and suppliers.109 In addition, the company also runs the risk of being viewed by the market for corporate control as “damaged goods” if the auction is unsuccessful.110 Thus, in the
event of a failed auction, it may take some time for a com-

The Delaware Court of Chancery also recognizes the
potential risks involved with a public auction. See In re
Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch.
2010) (implying leaked auctions may upset target’s employee base); In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holders Litig., 852
A.2d 9, 21 (Del. Ch. 2004) (recognizing benefits to single
bidder approaches).
109 See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d at 597
(recognizing possible employee strife resulting from
leaked auction); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., C.A.
Nos. 9536, 9561, 1991 WL 165304, at * 668-69 (Del. Ch.
July 31, 1991) (stating board resisted auction or market
canvass fearing adverse affect on target’s “relationships
with its employees, customers and suppliers”); Steven M.
Davidoff, What the Sound and Fury Over Best Buy May
Signify, N.Y. TIMES DEALB%K (Aug. 23, 2012 12:42 p.m.),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/what-the-soundand-fury-over-best-buy-may-signify/ (“Typically, targets
are quite skittish about publicly talking about negotiations. The reason is that this type of back and forth is unsettling for the company’s employees and operations.”).
110 Auctions in the M&A Process, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE
available
at
(Nov.
2007);
108

http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Auctions_in_the_M%
26A_Process.pdf.
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pany to successfully sell itself.111 Furthermore, although
potential bidders are required to execute confidentiality
agreements before being provided with a confidential offering memorandum or commencing due diligence, companies also risk proprietary or sensitive information being
disseminated to the public generally, and, in particular, to
competitors.112 In some cases, the target may have already been approached by a potential purchaser whose
bid may be lost if the target board were to choose to engage in a full-blown auction.113 Another common situation when targets choose to forgo a public auction is when
there are a limited number of viable potential buyers.
This is typically a result of the target’s business type or
on the financial situation.114 For example, a multi-billion

See Thomas W. Van Dyke, Chapter 6: Embarking on
the Sale Process, excerpted from A Practical Guide for the
111

Business Lawyer, 2005, at 804 (detailing disadvantages of
auctions, including length of time to sell company after
failed auction).
112 See also Topps, 926 A.2d at 62 (noting target’s “legitimate proprietary concerns” about sharing information
with competitor).
113 See, e.g., id. at 70 (stating buyer’s bid contingent on
target not conducting public auction); (same); See In re
Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d at 604 (stating target weighed risk of losing potential buyer if target conducted public auction); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig.,
926 A.2d 94, 119 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing risk of losing
initial bidder if target engaged in public auction or risk
initial bidder would pay less if response to auction was
“underwhelming”).
114 See Boone & Mulherin, supra note 42, 32-34 (“[T]he
costs of operating auctions often imply that limiting the
sales process can induce more aggressive bidding by those
allowed to participate in the process. . . . The argument
for a managed sales process may well be even stronger in
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dollar corporation may have a limited number of suitors
due to the corporation’s size or the industry in which it
operates.115 Hence a selling corporation may choose instead to engage in an informal auction process or to negotiate exclusively with one bidder.

2. The Pre-Signing Market Canvass and the
Negotiated Acquisition
Another alternative available to target companies is
the pre-signing market canvass, or the informal auction.
This is really a variation on the full-blown auction procorporate M&A, particularly in cases involving one or a
few large corporate bidders with significant expected synergies with the seller.”); Auctions in the M&A Process,
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2007); available at

http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Auctions_in_the_M%
26A_Process.pdf. (“Generally, auctions drive value up if
the buyer mix is robust . . . A targeted approach may be
warranted when there is obvious and limited universe of
buyers…Whether or not an auction will be favoured over
private negotiation will always depend on whether the
seller is price-driven or motivated by other factors. Sometimes it’s clear who is going to pay the most for an asset
so there is no real need to run an auction.”)
115 In their research, Boone and Mulherin point to the
$23 billion Wrigley deal in 2008, pursued through one-onone negotiations with Mars, and the 2008 Embarq deal
with CenturyTel for $5 billion, resulting from a field of
five potential buyers in the telecom industry, as examples
of why large companies are more likely to sell themselves
in one-on-one negotiations rather than auctions. See
Boone & Mulherin, supra note 42, at 32-34. See also
Boone & Mulherin, How Are Firms Sold?, supra note 56,
at 871 (2007) (finding that “the choice of an auction or a
negotiation in a particular takeover is related to characteristics such as target size and industry”).
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cess. In this type of sale process, the target, or its financial advisor, contacts a number of potential bidders to
gauge their interest in the target.116 The bidding process
(if one does exist) is in “a less structured setting than that
of a formal auction.”117
The pre-signing market canvass may help targets
avoid the previously discussed costs involved in a “busted”
auction as well as the costs involved in running a full auction. Moreover, a pre-signing market canvass may take
place after a previously not-for-sale target company has
been approached by a bidder or in situations, as discussed
in the next section, where the target has negotiated initially with only one bidder. In any event, the interested
potential bidders will be required to execute a confidentiality agreement, typically containing a standstill, before
gaining access to the target’s private information.
Another form of sale process is the negotiated acquisition or sequential procedure. In this type of sale process,
the target negotiates exclusively with one potential buyer.118 Like in the other sale processes, the potential buyer
will be required to execute a confidentiality agreement,
generally containing a standstill, prior to receiving the
target’s confidential information. If the initial potential
buyer is willing to pay a high enough price, then the deal
will sign without the target contacting other potential
buyers.119 In some scenarios, a potential buyer may condition its bid on the target not contacting any other potential buyers or otherwise performing a market canvass presigning.

Boone & Mulherin, How Are Firms Sold?, supra note
56, at 851.
116

117

Id.

118

Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400.

119

Id.
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3. Relevant Merger Agreement Deal Terms and
Post-Signing Sales Activities
Regardless of the sales method initially chosen however, because of a board’s fiduciary duty to consider higher
bids, an auction-like setting will likely result from the
sales process, implicating auction theory considerations.120 No matter if the target performs an auction or
negotiates with only one bidder, the resulting definitive
merger agreement will be publicly announced within a
day or two of execution.121 The merger agreement will
likely contain a no shop provision paired with a fiduciary
out. The no shop provision prevents the target company
from soliciting offers between signing and closing.122 But,
the fiduciary out allows a target company’s board of directors to negotiate with a third party who makes an unsolicited offer if the third party’s offer is a superior one or if it
is reasonably likely to become a “Superior Offer,” as that
term is defined in the merger agreement.123 In addition,
the fiduciary out allows the target company to terminate
the existing agreement in favor a third party offer if the
board determines it would be a violation of its fiduciary
duties not to do so.124 A typical prerequisite to the target
providing information to, and negotiating with, the overbidder is that the over-bidder must execute a confidentiality agreement with terms that are no less restrictive than

Denton, supra note 20, at 1533.
Audra Boone & L. Harold Mulherin, Do Termination
Provisions Truncate the Takeover Bidding Process?, 20
REV. FIN. STUD. 461, 475 (2007).
122 Christina M. Sautter, Rethinking Contractual Limits
on Fiduciary Duties, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 72-73
(2010).
123 Id. at 73.
120

121

124

Id.
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the initial acquirer’s confidentiality agreement.125 Thus,
because the initial acquirer’s confidentiality agreement
generally contained a standstill, the over-bidder’s confi-

125

See Denton, supra note 20, at 1539-40 (noting that go-

shops typically require “any third-party bidder to sign an
‘Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement’ with the seller in
order to have access to any material nonpublic information” in analyzing a typical go-shop provision, which
defined “Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement” as “(i)
any confidentiality agreement between the Company and
any such Person existing as of the date of this Agreement
and (ii) any confidentiality agreement entered into after
the date of this Agreement that contains provisions that
are no less favorable in the aggregate to the Company
than those contained in the Confidentiality Agreement”);
Robert Little, Travis Souza & Rachel Harrison, No-Shops

& Fiduciary Outs: A Survey of 2012 Public Merger
Agreements, DALLAS BAR ASSOCIATION (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://www.dallasbar.org/content/mergers-andacquisitions-section (finding, based on data from 53 public
company merger agreements in 2012 with transaction
values over $1 billion, that in most merger agreements an
acceptable confidentiality agreement with an alternative
bidder is one that is “no less favorable” or “not less restrictive”). See also Status Conference and Motion to Expedite at 89, In re Transatlantic Holdings, Inc. S’holder
Litig., C.A. Nos. 6574-CS & 6776-CS (Del. Ch. Aug. 22,
2011) (discussing a provision in a merger agreement requiring third party bidders to sign a confidentiality
agreement with a standstill no less favorable than the one
between the parties to the merger, and noting that it is an
“accepted norm of deal negotiation where a merger party
insists that later arriving bidders who are going to have a
chance play by certain rules that are as stringent as the
rules that apply to them”).
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dentiality agreement will likely contain a standstill.126 As
will be detailed in Part V., the possibility exists a target
board could use the standstill as a means of favoring the
initial acquirer over the over-bidder.
Recently, parties have also begun to use go-shop provisions in some transactions.127 Unlike a no shop provision,
go-shop provisions allow a target company to actively solicit third party offers post-signing for a limited period of
time.128 Like the no shop, a typical go shop requires bidders to execute a confidentiality agreement with no less
restrictive terms than the initial acquirer’s confidentiality
agreement meaning the bidder will be subject to a standstill.129
III. CURRENT USE OF STANDSTILLS IN M&A TRANSACTIONS
Although standstills are ubiquitous in today’s public
company M&A deals, to date the Delaware courts have
not extensively addressed the use of standstills. In fact,
most of Delaware’s guidance on the use of standstills in
M&A transactions comes to us through dicta. This section summarizes those recent cases in which the Delaware Court of Chancery has commented on standstills. In
addition, this section also includes a description of two
non-litigated transactions in which standstills played a
significant role in the sales process.

David Marcus, Confis, standstills and courts (Sept. 30,
2011),
available
at
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/041657/commentary
/confis,-standstills-and-courts.php
127 Sautter, Go-Shops, supra note 83, at 554-55 (discussing use of go-shops).
128 Id. at 557.
129 See, e.g., In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 66 (recognizing bidder required to execute confidentiality agreement containing standstill during go-shop period).
126
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A. Topps & the Impact of Standstills on the Sales Pro-

cess
The Delaware Chancery Court’s 2007 decision in In re
Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation provides some helpful
insight on the role and impact of standstills in a sale of
corporate control.130 That case involved a leveraged
buyout of Topps Co.131 The deal between the Michael
Eisner-led buyout group and Topps ensured the retention
of the majority of the company’s key employees and senior
management, including the CEO and Chairman’s son-inlaw who served as the company’s President and Chief
Operating Officer.132
Although a pre-signing auction or market canvass was
unacceptable under Eisner’s proposal, Eisner agreed to a
go-shop provision.133 Thus, the merger agreement “gave
Topps the chance to shop the bid for 40 days after signing,
and the right to accept a ‘Superior Proposal’ after that,
subject only to Eisner’s receipt of a termination fee and
his match right.”134 The termination fee amounted to 3.0%
of the transaction value during the go-shop period and
4.6% of the transaction value following the go-shop
period.135
At the outset of the go-shop period, Topps’s financial
advisor “contacted 107 potential strategic and financial
bidders, [of which] five expressed interest in Topps and
began a due diligence review.”136 The only serious bidder
who emerged during the go-shop period was Upper Deck,

926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007).
In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 60-61.
132 Id. at 60, 61, 73-74.
133 Id. at 61, 70.
134 Id. at 61.
135 Id. at 66.
130
131

136

Id.
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a competitor of Topps.137 Upper Deck’s bid, which was
submitted two days before the expiration of the go-shop
period, was for $10.75 cash per share, $1 more per share
than the Eisner proposal.138
The Topps board met after the go-shop period expired
to determine whether Upper Deck was an “Excluded
Party” under the terms of the Topps-Eisner merger
agreement, which would have allowed Upper Deck and
Topps to continue talks past the expiration of the go-shop
period.139 The Topps board decided Upper Deck was not
an “Excluded Party” raising concerns regarding Upper
Deck’s ability to finance the deal as well as antitrust
issues including the possibility antitrust authorities may
delay or prevent the transaction and Upper Deck’s failure
to sufficiently assume the antitrust risk.140 Upper Deck
then made an unsolicited proposal and offered to divest
key licenses if required to do so by antitrust regulators.141
The Topps board again determined the unsolicited
proposal was not a superior proposal raising similar
concerns.142 In addition and perhaps more importantly for
purposes of this Article, the Topps board rejected Upper
Deck’s request to be released from the standstill
agreement.143 The standstill prevented Upper Deck from
making public any information about its discussions with
Topps and also prevented Upper Deck from launching a
tender offer for Topps shares without the Topps board’s
permission.144
A group of Topps stockholders and Upper Deck moved
for a preliminary injunction maintaining that by refusing
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
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Id.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 62.
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to release Upper Deck from the standstill “Topps [was]
denying its stockholders the chance to decide for themselves whether to forsake the lower-priced Eisner Merger
in favor of the chance to accept a tender offer from Upper
Deck at a higher price.”145 Then Vice Chancellor Strine
began his analysis of the case by acknowledging the “legitimate purposes” standstills can serve including “establish[ing] rules of the game that promote an orderly auction” and providing a target with “leverage to extract concessions from the parties who seek to make a bid.”146 At
the same time, Strine acknowledged a board could use
standstills for illegitimate purposes like “favor[ing] one
bidder over another, not for reasons consistent with
stockholder interest, but because managers prefer one
bidder for their own motives.”147 Strine further recognized the Topps board’s reservation of the ability to waive
the standstill if the board’s fiduciary duties required it to
do so “was an important thing to do, given there was no
shopping process before signing with Eisner.”148 At the
same time, the board had an obligation to use its contractual powers for appropriate purposes.149
By refusing to release Upper Deck from the standstill,
the Topps board was preventing its stockholders from accepting a potentially higher offer and was preventing its
stockholders from receiving information regarding the
transaction.150 Moreover, the refusal to release Upper
Deck from the standstill prevented Upper Deck from attaining antitrust clearance.151 As a result, Strine found
Upper Deck “has shown a reasonable probability of suc145
146
147
148
149
150
151
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cess on its claim that the Topps board is misusing the
Standstill” and that Topps board’s asking its stockholders
to cash out and then foreclosing its stockholders from receiving Upper Deck’s offer was “likely, after trial, to be
found a breach of fiduciary duties.”152 Until quite recently, Strine’s decision in Topps was the leading case providing guidance on how dealmakers may use standstills during a sale of corporate control.
B. Potential Enforceability of DADW Standstills After

Topps
Five recent transactions from 2011 and 2012 provide
helpful commentary on the potential enforceability of
DADW standstills. The first two cases, In re Celera Corporation Shareholder Litigation and In re RehabCare
Group, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, arose in the context
of the Delaware Chancery Court’s approval of settlements.153 Thus, those cases simply provide dicta regarding the enforceability of DADW standstills. However, two
significant rulings were issued in the final months of 2012
that considered DADW standstills in depth. In the third
case, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Vice Chancellor Laster invalidated a confidentiality
agreement because it contained a DADW standstill.154 In
the fourth case, In re Ancestry.com Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Chancellor Strine found that the target board had
breached the duty of care because of the way it employed
a DADW standstill, not simply because the board did

Id.
In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., Civ. Action No. 6304VCP (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012); In re Rehabcare Group, Inc.
152

153

S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 8,
2011).
154 Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court’s Ruling, In
re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012).
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so.155 The Court of Chancery did not have an opportunity
to weigh in on the fifth, Apollo’s and KSL Capital Partners Management III, LLC’s fight for Great Wolf Resorts.
But, that deal provides an excellent example of the potentially erosive effects on shareholder value maximization
that some standstills may have during the pre-closing period.

1. RehabCare and the Questioned Viability of
DADW Standstills Following Topps
In late 2007 through early 2008, RehabCare Group,
Inc. (“Rehabcare”) and Kindred held preliminary discussions regarding Kindred’s possible acquisition of
RehabCare.156 At that time, “Kindred submitted a preliminary indication of interest to acquire RehabCare at a
price of $25.00 per share, with half payable in cash and
the other half in Kindred common stock.”157 But the discussions ended after the parties were unable to reach an
appropriate valuation for RehabCare.158 By the summer
of 2010, however, RehabCare’s situation changed, as its
stock price “dropped significantly.”159 The RehabCare
board met in August to review strategic alternatives, including “potential acquisition targets . . . and potential
financial and strategic partners.”160 The board determined the only viable strategic acquirer for RehabCare

The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig.,
C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012)
156 RehabCare Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8K)
(May 12, 2011).
155
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158
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160
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42

was Kindred.161 In making that decision, the board considered “four other logical potential strategic acquirers of
RehabCare and the various reasons that each such party
would not be a likely acquirer.162 These reasons included,
among others, public statements, prior business contacts,
leverage constraints, recent significant acquisitions, and
various regulatory and legal matters with respect to such
third parties.”163 However, the board was unsure about
Kindred’s willingness to proceed with a transaction based
on the previous failed discussions between the two parties.164 The board directed its financial advisor to contact
certain financial buyers to assess their interest in a potential transaction.165 The board also decided not to contact strategic bidders based on the board’s analysis of
those potential bidders’ willingness to engage in an acquisition with RehabCare as well as the board’s concern at
sharing confidential information with competitors.166
Starting on October 1, 2010, CGMI contacted nine financial buyers, including parties referred to as Party A
and Party B in the SEC disclosures.167 The financial buyers “were selected based on their experience in the
healthcare industry and their ability to finance a transaction of this size.”168 Of the nine, eight executed confidentiality and standstill agreements preventing those parties
from making unsolicited offers for RehabCare.169 At the
end of October, Kindred expressed an interest in engaging
in a transaction but it did not formally submit a bid, Party A submitted a preliminary offer in a price range of
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
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$25.00 to $27.00 per share and, on November 1, 2010,
Party B submitted a preliminary offer at a price of $27.00
to $30.00 per share.170 The other financial buyers did not
submit offers and withdrew from the sales process.171 The
next day, the RehabCare board met and determined to not
pursue discussions with either Party A or Party B, whose
offers were insufficient.172 On November 4, 2010, Kindred’s CEO called RehabCare’s CEO and expressed an interest in an all cash acquisition of RehabCare at a price
range between $32 and $34 per share.173 A couple of
weeks later, Kindred and RehabCare entered into a confidentiality agreement, including reciprocal standstill provisions.174
Discussions and due diligence continued
through December.175 On December 28, 2010, Kindred
submitted a written offer of $32.00 per share, payable
$27.00 in cash and $5.00 in Kindred common stock.176
RehabCare’s board met and determined it would not accept Kindred’s offer, viewing it as inadequate.177
About a week later, Kindred increased its offer price to
$35.00 per share.178 Under the revised offer, $26.00 was
payable in cash and $9.00 was payable in Kindred common stock.179 The parties executed a merger agreement
on February 7, 2011.180 Following the merger announcement, a number of RehabCare stockholders brought class
action suits against the RehabCare directors and Kin170
171
172
173
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175
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dred.181 Those suits were consolidated and, on May 12,
2011, the parties reached a memorandum of understanding regarding a settlement.182
Under the settlement, the RehabCare and Kindred
completely eliminated matching rights from the agreement, reduced their termination fee by 50 percent, and
issued supplemental disclosures.183 More importantly for
purposes of this Article, they waived existing standstill
provisions” and “sent letters to a number of financial
sponsors waiving [the] provisions.”184 The only issue before the court was the legal fees for the plaintiff’s counsel.185 With respect to the DADW standstills, Vice Chancellor Laster commented as follows:
I do think it is weird that people persist in
the "agree not to ask" in the standstill.
When is that ever going to hold up if it's actually litigated, particularly after Topps? It's
just one of those things that optically looks
bad when you're reviewing the deal facts. It
doesn't give you any ultimate benefit because
you know that the person can get a Topps
ruling making you let them ask, minimum,
or can ask in a back channel way. Why
would you hurt yourself in terms of the optics by asking for that? One of those strange
things in life.186
Hence, at least in Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion, even
in the context of a more thorough sales process compared
181
182
183
184
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Id.
Id.
In re Rehabcare Group, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No.
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to the sales process conducted in Topps, DADW standstills may not be upheld during the pre-closing period.

2. Celera and the Pre-Closing Period “Informational Vacuum”
Several months after Vice Chancellor Laster’s statement in RehabCare, Vice Chancellor Donald F. Parsons,
Jr. addressed a similar DADW standstill also in the context of a class action settlement, in In re Celera Corp.
Shareholder Litigation. The roots of that case began in
November 2009 when the board of directors of Celera
Corporation, a healthcare company with three primary
business units, started to consider potential strategic
transactions for the company.187 In early February, the
Celera board instructed its financial advisor, Credit
Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, and Celera senior management to engage in discussions with potential buyers regarding a sale of the whole company, its individual assets,
or business units.188 Credit Suisse and Celera’s CEO
“contacted nine potential bidders, five of which performed
at least some measure of due diligence on the Company by
April 2010: (1) Illumina, Inc.; (2) Inverness Medical Innovations, Inc.; (3) Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings; (4) Qiagen, N.V.; and (5) Quest.189 Each of the five
companies who performed due diligence executed a confidentiality agreement containing a standstill preventing
them from “making offers for Celera shares without an
express invitation from the Board.”190 The confidentiality
agreements also included “a broadly worded provision

187

In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., Civ. Action No.

6304-VCP, 3, 5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012).
188 Id. at 5-6.
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preventing the signing parties from asking the Board to
waive this restriction (the ‘[DADW] Standstills’).”191
In mid-April, Quest made a nonbinding preliminary offer to acquire the company as a whole for $10 cash per
share.192 Quest’s offer was conditioned on the execution of
several employment agreements with Celera’s “key personnel” including the CEO.193 In addition to the Quest
offer, other parties made “lesser offers” and “one indication of interest from ‘Bidder C’” to acquire the company’s
products division.194 Following negotiations with Celera’s
special committee, which was formed to oversee the sales
process, on June 25 Quest increased its offer by 25 cents
to $10.25 per share.195 The special committee determined
$10.25 was acceptable and authorized the CEO to negotiate her employment agreement with Quest.196 However,
after meeting with the CEO, Quest “withdrew from the
merger citing the potential effects” of a negative study on
one of Celera’s drugs, KIF6, that Quest learned of during
negotiations with the CEO as well as “‘concerns regarding
retention of the Company’s management following the
consummation of the proposed transaction.’”197 Throughout the remaining six months of 2010, Celera continued to
pursue strategic transactions but “no serious suitors
emerged.”198 During those six months, “Celera’s business
was deteriorating, due in part to the publication of the
negative KIF6 study in October.”199
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On January 27, 2011, Quest submitted an offer of $7.75
per share to acquire Celera.200 A few days later, Celera
rejected an offer from Bidder C to acquire the company’s
products division, instead choosing to focus on the Quest
offer.201 Negotiations proceeded with Quest and eventually, in mid-February, Quest and Celera entered into a
merger agreement.202 Under the agreement, Quest would
commence a twenty-day tender offer for Celera common
stock at $8 per share.203 The agreement contained a no
shop provision requiring Celera “to end any existing discussions, and not to solicit competing offers from, potential bidders other than Quest.”204 The agreement also
contained a termination fee amounting to 3.5% of the
transaction value, “but arguably as much as 10% of Celera’s enterprise value.”205
Following the merger announcement, a Celera shareholder brought suit alleging that the Celera board had
breached its fiduciary duties by executing an agreement
with Quest.206 Celera and Quest negotiated a settlement
with the lead plaintiff pursuant to which the termination
fee would be reduced from $23.45 million to $15.6 million
and the no shop provision would be amended so that bidders subject to the DADW provision of the standstill
would be invited to submit bids.207
Vice Chancellor Donald F. Parsons, Jr. issued an opinion upholding the settlement agreement.208 In the decision, Parsons stated he was not proclaiming DADW
200
201
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standstills unenforceable.209
Moreover, Parsons recognized DADW standstills are prevalent in today’s M&A
world and stated that any opinion declaring such provisions unenforceable could only be made on an “appropriately developed record.”210 At the same time, Parsons
stated the “[p]laintiffs have at least a colorable argument
that these constraints collectively operate to ensure an
informational vacuum.”211 Once the board is in an “informational vacuum,” it would not have any information
pursuant to which it could evaluate whether continuing to
comply with the merger agreement terms would violate
the board’s fiduciary duties.212 Thus, he explained,
“[c]ontracting into such a state could constitute a breach
of fiduciary duty.”213 Following Vice Chancellor Parsons’
thought process it is difficult to imagine a DADW standstill that would not have the effect of placing the board in
a change of control transaction in the same “informational
vacuum.”

3. Genomics and the Invalidity of DADW Standstills Preventing Even Private Indications of
Interest
A little over a year after considering the Rehabcare
deal and opining on DADW standstills, Vice Chancellor
Laster was given a better opportunity when the issue was
placed squarely before him. On November 27, 2012, Vice
Chancellor Laster issued a bench ruling in which he enjoined the enforcement of a DADW standstill—without
any suggestion that the sales process was inadequate or

209
210
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that a party restrained by the standstill desired to make a
bid.214
The DADW standstill at issue was entered into by
Complete Genomics and a third party during a sales process that began in May 2012.215 During the process, fortytwo parties were contacted and nine parties expressed interest and signed confidentiality agreements.216 After receiving six proposals, the Complete Genomics board narrowed the field to two parties.217 One of those parties,
Party H, withdrew after the board declined its request for
exclusivity.218 The board continued to negotiate with the
remaining bidder, BGI, and was able to reach a deal in
September.219 Party H later reentered the picture, uninhibited by any standstill provision, and submitted another
bid on November 5.220 However, the Complete Genomics
board concluded that the bid, which only represented a
5% premium and carried greater antitrust concerns, did
not constitute a superior proposal.221 The injunction issued by Vice Chancellor Laster pertained to the DADW
standstill entered into by Party J, who had only participated briefly in the sales process.222 Party J’s first expresTelephonic Oral Argument and the Court’s Ruling, In
re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012).
215 Complete Genomics, Inc., Solicitation, Recommendation Statements (Form SC 14D9) (Sep. 25, 2012).
214
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sion of interest came only a few weeks prior to July 31,
the date which final proposals were due from Party H and
BGI.223 Although late to join, Party J was held to the
same deadline.224 However, on August 2 Party J indicated
that it was not interested in pursuing a transaction, and
had no further communications with the Complete Genomics board prior to the issuance of the preliminary injunction.225 Party J neither sought the injunction nor was
involved in the litigation.226
In the ruling, Vice Chancellor Laster started by analogizing bidder-specific no-talk clauses, which were invalidated in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals
Co.,227 to DADW standstills reasoning that both can similarly disable a board from making a reasonably informed
decision.228 While not ruling that DADW standstills were
invalid per se, the fact that Complete Genomics had rec7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012); Complete Genomics,
Inc., Solicitation, Recommendation Statements (Form SC
14D9) (Sep. 25, 2012).
223 Complete Genomics, Inc., Solicitation, Recommendation Statements (Form SC 14D9) (Sep. 25, 2012).
224
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Complete Genomics, Inc., Solicitation, Recommendation Statements (Form SC 14D9) (Dec. 7, 2012).
226 Gary E. Thompson & Steven M. Haas, The State of
M&A Standstills In Delaware, Hunton & Williams Client
available
at
Alert
(Jan.
2013),
http://www.hunton.com/files/News/b91c8716-e69d-4ef1b510c3810f99af9d/Presentation/NewsAttachment/ee1368dafab8-489e-9652c3a423539c68/DE_MA_Standstill_Agreements.pdf
227 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., C.A.
No. 17398 (Del. Ch. Sep. 27, 1999).
228 Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court’s Ruling at
14-18, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A.
No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012).
225
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ommended the BGI transaction was influential in the decision.229 Laster reasoned that the Complete Genomics
board precluded the possibility of providing a current and
candid recommendation through the DADW standstill
agreement because it prevented the flow of information
from Party J.230 He found the agreement essentially embodied one to breach the duty of care to be informed of all
material information necessary to make a reasonably informed recommendation.231 Quoting section 193 of the Restatement of Contracts, Vice Chancellor Laster found a
reasonable probability that the DADW standstill provision “represents a promise by a fiduciary to violate its fiduciary duty, or represents a promise that tends to induce
such a violation.”232
Turning to the requirement of irreparable harm, he
found that the situation could not be remedied even in absence of a bid from Party J, who would be required to
“cavalierly breach its own promise” to present such a
harm. 233 Harking back to bidder-specific no-talk clauses,
the harm existed because incoming information from bidders would be prevented under any circumstance, regardless of whether Party J breached the standstill.234 Thus,
his concern focused on the harm caused by the board’s act
of pre-emptively preventing communication altogether,
not the harm that could result from another party being
unable to bid.235 Vice Chancellor Laster supported his
reasoning by adding that a topping bid, presumably from
Party H, was present but also went on to say that the rea-
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soning would apply in absence of a topping bid.236 Reflecting these concerns, the scope of the preliminary injunction
only sought to ensure that the channels of communication
were not closed: the order invalidated the provision of the
standstill to the extent that it prevented Party J from
making private requests for permission to submit bids
and had no effect on such public communications.237
4. Ancestry.com and Legitimate Use of DADW

Standstills for Value Maximizing Purposes
Less than three weeks after Vice Chancellor Laster
ruled on DADW standstills in Complete Genomics, Chancellor Strine weighed in, although expressing a very different view on the issue. In Ancestry.com, Chancellor
Strine was critical of the manner in which the board used
the DADW standstill, but otherwise sanctioned their general use as an auction tool for value-maximization purposes.238
The Ancestry.com sales process began in January 2012
when Party A, a private equity firm, contacted a representative of Spectrum Equity Investors to learn more
about the company.239 Spectrum, also a private equity
firm, had made a minority investment in Ancestry.com in
2003, later partnered with management to purchase a
majority interest, and helped to take the company public
in 2009.240 As of October 25, 2012, Spectrum owned a
236
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238 The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig.,
C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).
239 Ancestry.com Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Form
PREM14A) (Oct. 30, 2012).
240 Greg Roumeliotis & Nadia Damouni, Ancestry in sale
talks with three buyout firms: sources, REUTERS (Sep. 10,
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30.7% stake in Ancestry.com.241 In February of 2012, the
Ancestry.com board was informed of the potential interest
expressed by Party A and decided to explore engaging a
financial advisor.242 On March 16, the board authorized
discussions with Party A, subject to entry into a confidentiality agreement, which was executed by Party A later
that day.243 After meeting with Party A, a representative
of Party A indicated an interest in exploring a transaction
for a price between $30 and $32 a share.244 The board determined to perform a market check to evaluate the indication of interest from Party A.245
On April 22, a representative of private equity firm
Permira Funds contacted Ancestry.com management to
discuss a potential transaction.246 On May 15, the board
formally approved Qatalyst as its financial advisor and
authorized Qatalyst to begin conducting outreach to potential bidders.247 From May 15 to May 24, Qatalyst contacted four potential strategic bidders and eight private
equity firms including Party A and Permira.248 On May
17, Permira executed a confidentiality agreement.249 On
May 21, Party C, also a private equity firm, executed a

2012,
5:45
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/10/us-ancestrybuyout-idUSBRE88915L20120910.
241 Ancestry.com Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Form
PREM14A) (Oct. 30, 2012).
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confidentiality agreement.250 Party B and Party D, potential strategic acquirers, both declined to participate in the
sales process.251 On May 30 and 31, four additional private equity firms, Parties E, F, G, and H executed confidentiality agreements.252 On June 6, Bloomberg News reported that Ancestry.com had retained Qatalyst as a financial advisor.253 On June 14, Party J, a private equity
firm, executed a confidentiality agreement.254 Two potential strategic acquirers executed confidentiality agreements: Party I on June 4 and Party L on July 11, but neither ever submitted a proposal.255
On June 18, Party A reaffirmed its purchase price
range $31 to $34 per share.256 During the week of June 20
certain parties, all private equity firms, submitted preliminary proposals pursuant to a June 9 process letter.257
Purchase prices ranged from $31-$38.258 After the Ancestry.com board met to discuss proposals, Qatalyst notified
the lowest bidders Party A, Party F, and Party H that
they would not be invited to continue in the process.259
Party G dropped out of the sales process on July 9.260
Party K, a private equity firm that first expressed interest on June 13, indicated a price range of $33 to $35 on
June 25, and executed a confidentiality agreement on
250
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June 28.261 After a July 9 meeting, the board determined
to invite Party C, Party J, and Permira to submit final
bids.262 However, on August 2 Party J ceased due diligence efforts, after substantially lowering its valuation
range.263 On July 24, an article was published in the New
York Times reporting that Ancestry.com was possibly going private.264 On August 6, Party C also lowered its valuation based on its due diligence, indicating a $31 price as
the sole equity sponsor and $32 with a substantial equity
partner.265 On August 7, Permira followed suit, lowering
its price to $33 per share, contingent on an additional equity partner.266
The Ancestry.com board had several meetings over the
next few weeks to discuss alternatives, including reengaging Party A, who remained interested in pursuing a
transaction, either as the sole purchaser or through a
partnership with Permira.267 Believing that a collaboration between Party A and Permira would lower Party A’s
standalone bid, the board authorized Permira and Party
C to begin discussions.268 However, the joint proposal
from Permira and Party C was returned at a price of $30
per share.269 Party A later indicated that based on further
due diligence, it would only be able to offer $28 per
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share.270 On September 10, Reuters published a story on
the sales process.271
Over the next few weeks, the board told Party C that
an offer at $30 would not be acceptable and focused on assisting Permira with additional financing strategies.272
On October 2, Bloomberg news published an additional
report on the sales process.273 The report discussed the
difficulties seen in reaching a price, noting that private
equity firms on both sides of the deal created tension and
that Spectrum likely needed to sell to satisfy investment
exit requirements typically imposed on private equity
firms.274 On October 3, Permira submitted a proposal for
$31 per share.275 After further negotiations, Permira
raised its bid to $32, stating that it would not go any
higher.276 After making additional modifications, the
merger agreement was executed on October 21.277
Litigation was filed challenging the propriety of the
DADW standstills used in the process that were not previously mentioned in the SEC filings.278 Ancestry.com reacted on December 11 and sent letters waiving the DADW
provisions to allow parties to request standstill waivers.279
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275 Ancestry.com Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Form
PREM14A) (Oct. 30, 2012).
276
277

Id.
Id.

Ancestry.com Inc., Current Report (Form 8K) (Dec. 19,
2012).
278

279

Id.

2013]

AUCTION THEORY & STANDSTILLS

On December 17, Chancellor Strine issued his ruling.280
Strine was careful to take a fact based approach and not
make a per se ruling, noting the limited precedential value of bench rulings generally before discussing Complete
Genomics and Celera.281 Strine contemplated that DADW
standstills could be used consistently with a board’s fiduciary duties, but only when used for a particular valuemaximizing purpose.282 More specifically, he stated that
the “purpose has to be to allow the seller as a wellmotivated seller to use it as a gavel, to impress upon the
people that it has brought into the process the fact that
the process is meaningful; that if you're creating an auction, there is really an end to the auction for those who
participate.”283
Strine went on to find that, had the board not waived
the DADW provisions, it would not have been using the
DADW standstill for a specific value-maximizing purpose
because it was not used in the manner he set forth.284 In
fact, the Ancestry.com board and CEO were not even
aware of the clause or its potency and it was not clear
whether Qatalyst was informed either.285 In light of the
waiver, Strine’s order merely required disclosure of the
circumstances surrounding the use and waiver of the
DADW provision.286
The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig.,
C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).
281 Id. at 20-22 (“And the Celera case expressly went out
of its way to say it's not making a per se rule. I think
what Genomics and Celera both say, though, is Woah,
this is a pretty potent provision.”).
282 Id. at 23.
280
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285 Id. at 24-25.
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5. The Potentially Erosive Effects of Standstills
on Value Maximization During the PreClosing Period
In addition to the potential informational vacuum and
communication issues caused by standstills pre-closing, if
used improperly, standstills may have other potentially
erosive effects on value maximization. For example, as
Chancellor Strine recognized in Topps, target boards can
use standstills to favor a “winning” bidder over others.287
In addition, “winning” bidders will generally advocate for
strict standstills as a form of deal protection device that
can preclude “losing” bidders from any participation after
signing.288 Both of these scenarios became a reality in the
2012 sale of Great Wolf Resorts.
The sale of Great Wolf began in January 2011 when
various private equity groups and potential strategic buyers approached Great Wolf representatives expressing interest in a potential transaction.289 Between January
and June, the company entered into five confidentiality
agreements with strategic and financial parties, including
Apollo.290 At a June 22 meeting, the Great Wolf board began a more formal strategic review process and instructed
its legal advisor “to review the five confidentiality agreements previously entered into with potential bidders and
to negotiate amendments to such agreements as appropriate given the Company’s defensive profile.”291 Following the meeting, Great Wolf revised several confidentiali-
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ty agreements to include standstill provisions “for the
protection of Great Wolf.”292
On July 27, Great Wolf’s Strategic Review Committee
authorized Deutsche Bank to begin a formal process, and
approximately 38 potential bidders, including strategic
and financial parties, were contacted.293 Deutsche Bank
distributed confidentiality agreements to approximately
33 parties interested in a strategic transaction.294 Between July 27 and December 23, Great Wolf entered into
confidentiality agreements with 11 additional parties, including parties referred to in SEC filings as Party N and
Party J, and continued to amend previously executed confidentiality agreements to include more restrictive standstill covenants.295 Of particular note is that the ApolloGreat Wolf standstill remained far less restrictive than
any agreement entered into by Great Wolf.296
As the sales process progressed, the field was narrowed
to Party N, Party J, and Apollo.297 After evaluating proposals, Great Wolf agreed to an exclusivity agreement
with Apollo Management (the “Exclusivity Agreement”)
on December 21 based largely on financing considerations
and the fact that Apollo had conducted greater due diligence.298 Yet, much additional negotiation was needed,
and several successive extensions of exclusivity occurred
before Great Wolf accepted an offer from Apollo priced at
$5 per share.299 On March 12, 2012, the transaction,
structured as a tender offer, was approved and executed
292
293
294
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by Apollo and Great Wolf.300 The next day and also the
very same day the transaction was publicly announced,
Apollo commenced the tender offer, which was only
scheduled to be open for 21 business days.301
The definitive agreement provided a strong deal protection scheme for Apollo.302 The definitive agreement contained a no-shop provision and provided Great Wolf would
not “terminate, waive, amend, modify or fail to enforce
any existing standstill or confidentiality obligations owed
by any Person to the Company or any of its Subsidiaries,”
subject to limited exceptions.303 Under the no-shop, Great
Wolf was only permitted to entertain unsolicited bona fide
written takeover proposals.304 Great Wolf also agreed to
“immediately cease and cause to be terminated any discussions or negotiations with any parties that may be ongoing with respect to any Takeover Proposal as of the date

300
301

Id.
Id.

Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K),
§1.5 (Mar. 13, 2012). The deal provisions included an irrevocable top up option giving Apollo the right, if it were
to acquire over 50% of Great Wolf shares in the tender offer, to purchase enough new Great Wolf shares at $5.00 to
obtain 90% ownership to accomplish a short-form merger
and a poison pill that would be triggered if any party other than Apollo accumulated more than 12.5% of Great
Wolf’s shares. Id. Additionally, the deal allowed for $7
million in total termination fees (as opposed to Apollo’s
previously proposed $30 million termination fee) and, in
the event that a bidder should be able to overcome these
obstacles, Apollo was granted matching rights. Great Wolf
Resorts, Inc., Solicitation, Recommendation Statements
(Form SC 14D9) (Mar. 13, 2012).
303 Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K,
Exhibit 2.1), §6.5 (Mar. 13, 2012).
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of the Merger Agreement.”305 In combination, the deal
protections and reinforced standstill—created through an
agreement made to the exclusion of the other parties—
ensured that losing bidders would not even think about a
bid.
After the merger announcement, Great Wolf’s shares
began to trade well above the $5 offer price from Apollo,
shareholders began to publicly criticize the deal, and several lawsuits were filed.306 Thereafter on April 4, despite
Apollo’s iron-clad deal protection scheme, Great Wolf confirmed by press release the receipt of an unsolicited bid
from KSL Capital Partners at a price of $6.25 per
share.307 On April 5, in accordance with the definitive
agreement, KSL and Great Wolf entered into a confidentiality agreement.308 However, that agreement waived
the standstill provisions with respect to the April 4 KSL
Proposal and any future favorable proposals from KSL.309
A bidding war ensued between Apollo and KSL until
Apollo delivered the last blow with a $7.85 offer, and an
increase in termination fees to $10.467 million, to which
Apollo and Great Wolf agreed on April 20.310
The $7.85 offer price represented a premium of 171% to
the six-month average of Great Wolf’s share price prior to
the announcement of Apollo’s original offer on March 12,
2012, a premium of 136% over the ninety-day average of
Great Wolf’s share price prior to the announcement of the
original offer, and a premium of 87% over Great Wolf’s
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closing stock price on the day prior to the announcement
of the original offer.311
On April 25, an agreement in principle was reached in
the litigation.312 In connection with the settlement, Great
Wolf agreed to make certain disclosures in its SEC filings
and waive the standstill provisions with certain parties,
including Party N, solely for the purpose of allowing those
parties to deliver a confidential unsolicited bona fide written takeover proposal.313 In addition to exposing the details of the standstill agreements and the poison pill mentioned earlier, the disclosures required by the settlement
revealed that during the process Deutsche Bank may
have had a material conflict of interest and Great Wolf
may have been aware.314 Luckily for the Great Wolf
shareholders, the favorable treatment of Apollo, that
granted excessive deal protections facilitated by the use of
a standstill, did not ultimately prevent the highest offer
from being made.
C. Hollywood Video & the Potential Detrimental Im-

pact of Standstills During Pre-Closing Market
Checks
In the context of a post-signing market check, the potential detrimental impact of requiring over-bidders to
execute the same constrictive standstill to which the initial acquirer is subject may be best illustrated by events
surrounding the sale of Hollywood Video. On December
10, 2003, the Hollywood board met to discuss strategic options after Mark Wattles, the founder, chairman, CEO,
and second largest shareholder of Hollywood Entertainment, had been informed of various private equity firms
311
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that could potentially acquire Hollywood, including Leonard Green & Partners (LGP ). 315Wattles met with LGP,
negotiations continued over the following weeks, and LGP
signed a non-disclosure agreement containing a threeyear standstill provision.316 On February 19, 2004, LGP
submitted a formal proposal to acquire 100% of Hollywood’s stock for $13 per share in cash.317
The following day, the Special Committee rejected the
$13 price as inadequate and decided not to solicit additional bidders, fearing the risks of material non-public information leaks or a failed transaction.318 LGP then
raised its offer to $13.50 per share and proposed several
ancillary agreements with Wattles.319 After negotiations
over the ancillary agreements, LGP raised its offer to $14
per share and the merger agreement was executed on
March 28.320
The merger agreement contained a no-shop provision
with a fiduciary out.321 Litigation ensued, resulting in a
settlement requiring additional disclosures in the proxy
statements, a reduction of the termination fee from $26.5
million to $21.2 million, and that Wattles’ shares would
not be counted in voting on the merger.322 After LGP expressed doubt about whether the financing condition of
the merger agreement could be satisfied, the merger
agreement was amended on October 13 to reduce the

Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Preliminary Proxy
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price from $14 to $10.25, and eliminate the termination
fee and no shop provision.323
Beginning the week of October 25, UBS contacted 25
potential financial buyers and 12 potential strategic buyers, including Movie Gallery and Blockbuster.324 On October 28, Movie Gallery requested confidential information.325 To access confidential information, the amended merger agreement required bidders to enter into a
confidentiality agreement no less favorable to Hollywood
than the one entered into by LGP, which contained a
three-year standstill.326 Movie Gallery initially objected
to the standstill provision.327 On October 29, Blockbuster
also requested confidential information..328
On November 2, Blockbuster delivered an all-cash proposal at$11.50 per share. but also indicated that it was
unwilling to enter into a standstill with a three-year
term.329 Movie Gallery first unsuccessfully sought to revise the standstill term from three years to one year, but
on November 19, inexplicably entered into a confidentiality agreement identical to the agreement between Hollywood and LGP with a three-year standstill.330 On December 1, Movie Gallery increased its offer to $13.25
cash.331 Blockbuster later issued a press release confirming it was interested and able to raise its offer, subject to
elimination of the standstill.332
Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Preliminary Revised
Proxy Statement (Form PRER14A) (Oct. 27, 2004).
324
Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Preliminary Proxy
Statement (Form PREM14A) (Jan. 26, 2005).
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A Special Committee meeting was held a few days later
to consider LGP’s indication that it would waive the obligation under the merger agreement to include a standstill
provision.333 The Special Committee concluded that including a standstill for all bidders would yield the highest
possible price by encouraging bidders to submit their best
offers during the market check process, knowing that they
would be precluded from making a later bid.334 It further,
concluded that the standstill assured bidders that the
process would be fair to all involved and refused to eliminate the standstill provision.335
Blockbuster again issued a press release reiterating its
unwillingness to enter into a three-year standstill and on
December 28, Blockbuster announced it would commence
a tender offer for Hollywood at $11.50 cash per share.336
On January 10, 2005, Hollywood announced it had terminated the LGP agreement and entered into an agreement
with Movie Gallery.337 On February 2, Blockbuster raised
its tender offer to a price of $14.50 per share, comprised of
$11.50 cash and $3 stock.338 However, However, on
March 25 Blockbuster announced it would no longer pursue the tender offer..339
Had Blockbuster been brought into the market check
process, its presence might have pressured a bidding war
between strategic rivals.. After the Blockbuster bid received backing from Carl Icahn, Wattles stated, “A strategic buyer can afford to pay more for this company than a
333
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financial buyer and I am a financial buyer.”340A three
year standstill, as Scott Keller, president of
Dealanalytics.com stated, is “highly unusual,” and “[o]ne
year is the norm.”341
The imposition of onerous standstills like the one in
Hollywood Video is not unique in the M&A world. Although they are common, as the next section details, the
imposition of such standstills is potentially detrimental to
shareholders in a sale of corporate control and is contrary
to auction theory principles.
IV. BALANCING FRIENDS AND FOES IN A SALE OF CORPORATE
CONTROL
In most corporate transactions, the parties on both
sides of the negotiating table use contracts to manage and
balance risks. In the context of M&A transactions, standstills are one of the main contractual tools used to balance
risks inherent in the sale process. Namely, target boards
Jonathan Berr, Blockbuster Says Hollywood Offer Faces ‘Difficulty’, Bloomberg (Dec. 22, 2004, 16:46), available
at Blockbuster Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit
99.1) (Dec. 23, 2004).
341 Jonathan Berr, Blockbuster Says Hollywood Offer Faces ‘Difficulty’, Bloomberg (Dec. 22, 2004, 16:46), available
at Blockbuster Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit
99.1) (Dec. 23, 2004). The three-year standstill requirement imposed on subsequent bidders stemmed from the
original agreement with LGP, when LGP and Wattles
were going to buy Hollywood together. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Form
PREM14A) (Apr. 23, 2004). Wattles was to continue serving as CEO and remain a substantial equity investor in
the surviving company. Id. The contemplated employment
agreement between Wattles and LGP was to terminate on
the third anniversary of the merger. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Schedule 13E-3 (Form SC 13E3, Exhibit
99.D4) (Apr. 23, 2004).
340
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use standstills legitimately to control the sale process to
ensure friendly bidders remain friendly and do not becomes foes that preempt the process. However, in the
context of a change of control transaction, standstills also
potentially carry a risk they will inhibit and not enhance
shareholder value. This section uses auction theory principles and examples of dealmakers’ real world uses of
standstills to detail how standstills help to enhance the
sales process. But this does not mean that all standstills
will universally aid the value maximization process in
every deal. When standstills contain certain provisions or
are used in certain ways, standstills can inhibit value
maximization. Specifically, standstills with unusually restrictive terms can contractually prevent fair and open
competition and hurt the sales process. Moreover, even
though initially a standstill may seem relatively unrestrictive, it can become overly restrictive when a definitive merger agreement is signed. Contractual provisions
in the agreement can enhance the restrictiveness of existing standstills, resulting in a combination that, not only
affects the rights of parties not privy to the merger
agreement, but becomes prohibitive to final value maximization. Standstills that are, or become, overly restrictive should not be used unless careful consideration is
given and the particular circumstances of the deal warrant their application. While a board’s actions need not be
perfect, courts should be particularly wary of standstills
that do more to restrict the sales process than to promote
the best deal.
A. Standstills in General – Using Standstills to Make

Friends, Prevent Foes, and Maximize Stockholder
Value
With so many moving pieces in a real world M&A auction, it is difficult, if not impossible, to rely on one factor
to extract higher bids during the pre-signing sales pro-
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cess. At the same time, standstills play an important role
in the negotiation and sale of public companies.
Dealmakers certainly believe standstills enhance the bidding process for public targets. But the ultimate question
is whether this is truly the case.
In the case of a pure auction, Professors Bulow and
Klemperer argue that because participants are “relatively
ill-informed” when entering an auction the auction is
“more profitable” than other sale processes, namely a sequential process.342 Because bidders enter into most
standstills as part of a confidentiality agreement and in
consideration for the receipt of confidential information,
many bidders would not have access to information if they
were not willing to execute a standstill.343
Thus, by being willing to play by the “rules of the game,”
a bidder is able to engage in due diligence and is on a
more level playing field with respect to information
asymmetries. Therefore, a bidder is better able to make
an informed decision regarding its valuation of the target.
Auction theorists have found that by being provided with
proprietary information a bidder is put at ease and is
more likely to submit a higher bid.344 It follows that
standstills likely enhance the pre-signing bidding process
to the extent standstills are inextricably tied to the provision of information. Moreover, standstills may provide
bidders with an economic incentive to submit their highest bid because of the opportunity cost of losing the auction, perhaps to a competitor, by not submitting the best
bid.
Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 59, at 1546.
Boone & Mulherin, supra note 42, at 34 (“In exchange
for signing [standstill] agreements, prospective bidders
are given access to non-public information about the seller
. . . .”).
344 Id. at 34 (“Revealing proprietary information can reduce uncertainty for some buyers, which increases the
price they are willing to pay.”)
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Auction theorists have also found the implementation
of rules and commitment to those rules play a significant
role in whether a given sales process maximizes stockholder value.345 By implementing rules like standstills
targets are able to control the sales process. In turn, potential bidders receive some assurance that another bidder engaged in the process will not preempt the sales process by submitting a bid prematurely.346 Due to these assurances bidders may be more likely to submit a higher
bid. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, most confidentiality agreements and standstills prevent bidders
from revealing that negotiations are taking place. That
combined with the fact that standstills prevent bids before the target is ready to receive them, allows the target
to control the flow of information regarding valuation. As
previously discussed because most auctions are “sealedbid” auctions, the bidders are kept uninformed of each
others’ bids so the target is able to ensure that a “high”
bidder will not reduce its bid or refuse to raise its bid after learning that the next closest bid is somewhat lower.347
Another significant factor in whether a bidder is willing to submit a higher bid may turn on whether strategic
or financial bidders are involved in the process. As a result, this Article advocates that courts and dealmakers
should consider standstills on a continuum from least restrictive to most restrictive. A significant factor in how
restrictive a standstill may be and still be deemed legitimate would be the types of bidders involved in the sale
process.

1.

Strategic Bidders & the Private Value Sale
Process

Povel & Singh, supra note 19, at 1425.
See supra Part I.C.
347 See text accompanying supra note 103.
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Generally, strategic bidders are interested in the actual business of the target or the target’s distinct characteristics that the strategic bidder may exploit for synergistic
purposes.348 As Professors Gorbenko and Malenko point
out, strategic bidders “are less tied to publicly observable
characteristics” like financial statements or market indicators so that the end result is that each strategic bidder’s
valuation of the target is “unique.”349 Because strategic
bidders tend to operate in related businesses, releasing
confidential information to these bidders is more likely to
result in a loss of competitive advantages for the target.350
As such, targets have a keen interest in controlling the
sale process and particularly the release of nonpublic information to strategic bidders. Accordingly, stronger,
more restrictive standstills may help to protect the target
while at the same time encourage strategic bidders to
submit higher bidders.
Because of the unique synergies at stake in any given
transaction, a strategic bidder may be willing to pay more
for a target, but at the same time, a strategic bidder also
has more to lose. If a strategic bidder does not “win” a
particular auction, there may not be similar companies in
existence that have the same characteristics as the target.
Moreover, if multiple strategic bidders who are competitors are involved in a particular auction process, the strategic bidder may be further motivated to submit a higher
bid as the bidder’s loss will be its competitor’s gain. So,
losing the bidding war to a competitor could result in an
even greater loss to the strategic bidder. Therefore, if a
strategic bidder is bound by a stronger standstill it has
even greater reasons to put forth its best bid during the
348

See supra Part I.A.

Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 2, manuscript at 4.
Povel & Singh, supra note 19, at 1405 (noting that
strategic buyers can be competitors, suppliers, or customers).
349
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bidding process. Hence, in a sales process where only
strategic bidders are bidding more biased procedures such
as more restrictive standstills may help to deal with information asymmetries and encourage bids.

2. Financial Bidders & the Common Value Sale
Process
Unlike strategic bidders, most financial bidders are
not viewing targets with an eye toward synergistic results.351 Instead, these bidders tend to base their valuations “on observable factors, captured by the information
about the targets available from the market and financial
statements.”352 As financial buyers differ from strategic
buyers because they do not similarly operate in the same
business as the target and tend to base their bids on public information, the same concerns regarding confidential
information releases are not present, and thus the need
for a more protective standstill is also lessened. Although
financial bidders may have some variation in their bid
prices stemming from their own individual estimates or
projections, it is more likely that a certain price or range
of prices will likely serve as the price that gets the target.353 Unlike strategic bidders, most financial bidders
will not have as much to lose in “losing” an auction because potential synergies are not at stake. Because targets do not provide a source of unique value to a financial
bidder, they are more likely to view targets as interchangeable and not have an incentive to pursue any one
target.
Financial bidders are also more likely to be able to
force a deal because they are sophisticated in deal making
and because they have leverage, like little to no anti-trust
351

See supra Part I.A.
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uncertainty and substantial financing resources, with
which to work. It follows that a more restrictive standstill
will likely do little to encourage higher bids. In fact, the
more restrictive standstill could serve the opposite purpose and prevent financial bidders from making a bid.
Yet another factor to consider with financial bidders is
their tendency not to overbid another financial bidder’s
signed transaction.354 Chancellor Strine even acknowledged these gentlemen’s agreements saying that it is “a
reality that there is not a culture of rampant topping
among the larger private equity players, who have relationships with each other that might inhibit such behavior.”355 A recent lawsuit against eleven private equity
firms suggest that these gentlemen’s agreements may
have extended into pre-signing auctions and that private
equity firms colluded during the 2003-2007 merger wave
to drive down the price of target companies.356 More specifically, the lawsuit alleges there was a “secret pact”
among the firms in which there was a “‘you don’t bid on
my deal, I won’t bid on yours’ understanding.”357 Against
this backdrop, it is hard to imagine how a more restrictive
standstill would work to extract more value. Indeed, if the
Sautter, supra note 83, at 560. After private equity
giant, Blackstone, outbid Kolhberg Kravis Roberts
(K.K.R.) for Freescale Semiconductor, Hamilton Jones,
Blackstone’s President, wrote to his colleagues, “‘Henry
Kravis [co-founder of K.K.R.] just called to say congratulations and that they were standing down because he had
told me before they would not jump a signed deal of ours .
. . .’” Peter Lattman & Eric Lichtblau, E-Mails Cited to
354

Back Lawsuit’s Claims That Equity Firms Colluded On
Big Deals, N.Y. TIMES DEALB%K (Oct. 10, 2012 7:42 p.m.).
355 In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 121.
356
Peter Lattman & Eric Lichtblau, E-Mails Cited to
Back Lawsuit’s Claims That Equity Firms Colluded On
Big Deals, N.Y. TIMES DEALB%K (Oct. 10, 2012 7:42 p.m.).
357 Id.
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allegations of collusion are correct, standstills would likely be rendered valueless.
B. Using Restrictive Standstills to Extract More Value

and Make “Friends”
Although standstills generally aid in value maximization, overly restrictive standstills may cause adverse effects to a sales process involving corporate control.
Standstills are overly restrictive when the provisions of
the agreement are far too strict or onerous than necessary
to accomplish the intended functions required of standstills in the sales process. In particular, this section focuses on potentially restrictive standstills such DADW
standstills and longer-term standstills. In a previous article, Promises Made to be Broken? Standstill Agreements
in Change of Control Transactions, I argued the Delaware
courts are likely to resolve issues relating to the reasonableness of standstill restrictions and the grant of a waiver
(or the promise not to waive a standstill) based on the
reasonableness of the target board’s sale process.358 More
specifically, the courts are likely to examine the presigning sales process in resolving these issues.359 But
that article did not address the more fundamental issue of
whether the use of such restrictive standstills results in
shareholder value maximization. I argue that this question should be answered by recognizing the need to maintain the standstill’s teeth but not sharpen them when
other deal protection mechanisms alleviate the workload
borne by standstills post-signing. Moreover, consistent
with the auction theory principles set forth previously, the
restrictiveness and use of standstills should be evaluated
based on the types of bidders involved in the sale process.
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1. DADW Standstills
In Celera, Vice Chancellor Parsons warned that
DADW standstills may have the effect of placing the target board in an informational vacuum and that once the
board is in such a vacuum it would not be able to obtain
information pursuant to which it could evaluate whether
continuing to comply with the merger agreement terms
would violate the board’s fiduciary duties.360 As a result,
Parsons suggested that the board of directors would be
breaching its fiduciary duties.361 Laster then commented
in RehabCare that DADW standstills “optically look bad”
and that they are likely inconsistent with Strine’s ruling
in Topps.362 Laster also seemed to suggest that even in
the context of a fully shopped deal, a DADW standstill
may not be valid.363 Chancellor Strine, also the author of
the Topps opinion, issued the most recent commentary
and ruling on DADW standstills in Ancestry.com. In that
case, Strine focused on whether the standstill was being
used as a “gavel” with a specific a value maximizing purpose and whether the bidders were made aware there
may not be any more bites at the apple.364 Although
seemingly irreconcilable at first glance, these opinions can
be combined with auction theory principles and folded into a workable system in which targets can utilize these

In re Celera, C.A. No. 6304-VCP, at 53-54.
Id. at 54.
362 In re Rehabcare, C.A. No. 6197-VCL, at 46.
363 See Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court’s Ruling,
In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No.
7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2012) and Telephonic Oral
Argument and the Court’s Ruling, In re Complete Ge360

361

nomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch.
Nov. 27, 2012).
364 Id. at 23.
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more restrictive standstills to enhance value maximization.
This system begins by dividing the sales processes into
those with mainly strategic bidders and those with mainly
financial bidders. As previously described, because strategic bidders tend to private values for a target stemming
from the valuation strategic bidders give the particular
synergies which may be realized if the bidder were to acquire the target, more restrictive standstills, like DADW
standstills, may help a target extract greater value from
strategic bidders. However, some limitations must be
placed on the use of the standstills to obtain the most value enhancing incentives. First, consistent with Strine’s
indication in Topps and my argument in Promises Made

to be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control
Transactions, the target board must engage in significant
pre-signing shopping of the target. Such a pre-signing
shopping may help the board to eliminate the potential
for placing itself in the informational vacuum of which
Vice Chancellor Parsons warns. Second, consistent with
Chancellor Strine’s comments in Ancestry.com, all bidders
entering into the bidding process and entering into standstill agreements with the target must be fully informed of
the rules in advance, including the fact that the standstills will not be waived once the sales process has come to
an end. Third, to maintain the integrity of the sales process, the target must continue to abide by the rules it sets
forth and not make concessions to one bidder over another
or otherwise favor one bidder.
Fourth, unlike the DADW standstills we have seen to
date, I contend the standstill should be paired with a minimal fiduciary out. That is, a bidder bound by such a
standstill should be able to privately request a waiver if it
can set forth compelling and clearly delineated reasons
that it would like to make or increase its bid. These reasons should be based on external and intervening factors
such as the release of new information, which would cause
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the bidder to increase its valuation of the target. This
minimal fiduciary out is analogous to the merger recommendation fiduciary out for intervening events that have
become popular in recent years.365
In my previous article, Promises Made to be Broken?
Standstill Agreements in Change of Control Transactions,
I made clear that although the Delaware courts may likely take a different path based on their dicta to date, I was
of the opinion that boards of directors should not be able
to completely limit their ability to review superior offers
in the context of sale of corporate control.366 Allowing
“losing” bidders to request a waiver and make an overbid
pursuant to a minimal fiduciary out strikes a balance between the concern that boards should not foreclose themselves from considering higher bids and the legitimate
goal as supported by auction theory principles of using
standstills to extract more value pre-signing.
If such a fiduciary out were to be implemented, it
should be paired with a slightly higher termination fee
applicable in these limited circumstances to these bidders.
For example, if the merger agreement contains a 3% termination, a 4 or 4.5% termination fee may be appropriate.
The goal behind the minimal fiduciary out is to limit or
eliminate the informational vacuum these standstills potentially cause. By pairing the minimal fiduciary out
with a slightly increased termination fee, the goal is
maintain the “teeth” of the standstill.
Moreover, a similar staggered termination fee has been
used in some recent deals in the context of a change of
merger recommendation based on an intervening event
rather than a superior proposal.367 In those deals, if the
For a description of these merger recommendation fiduciary outs for intervening events, see Sautter, supra
note 122.
366 Sautter, supra note 6, at manuscript at 60 n.433.
367 David Fox & Daniel E. Wolf, Something Old, Some365
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board were terminate the agreement for an intervening
event, a higher termination fee becomes payable.368 Thus,
dealmakers have experience in negotiating and interpreting these intervening events as well as the staggered termination fees that may be applicable.
As previously established, unlike with strategic bidders, more restrictive standstill provisions may not lead to
the same value maximizing results with financial bidders.
The same “system” may be implemented in sale processes
involving mainly financial bidders but because financial
bidders tend to have a common value for a target, the
DADW standstill is not likely to extract much additional
value. With financial bidders, the already in place gentlemen’s agreements and possible collusion appear to render such restrictive standstill provisions useless.
The foregoing framework rests on the assumption that
the sales process used is that of a classic auction as described in Part II.B.1. The likelihood of a classic auction
being used as the chosen sales process is significant as
Professors Boone and Mulherin’s study of 400 corporate
takeovers found that half resulted from an auction process.369 The framework would also work in the context of
an extensive market canvass as described in Part II.B.2.
Although dealmakers should opt for less restrictive standstill terms in such situations as there is a greater risk
that they have not shopped the market and that the value

Public M&A Deal Terms, Kirkland M&A Update, 1 (May
available
at
2,
2011),
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/MAUpdat
e_050211.pdf (mentioning deals with a higher termination
fee payable for a change of recommendation for an intervening event); see also Sautter, supra note 122, at 103-04
(suggesting a higher termination fee be applicable to intervening event change of recommendations).
368 Fox & Wolf, supra note 367.
369 See Part II.B.I.
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being received is not as high as that which could be received pursuant to an auction.

2. Longer-Term Standstills
Standstills with unusually long durations, like that in
the Hollywood Entertainment deal, can be overly restrictive. Hollywood Entertainment’s three-year term standstill lasted for a period three times as long as that of an
average standstill. Because of this burdensome provision,
at least one major player, Blockbuster, was not even willing to enter into the standstill agreement and participate
in a friendly process. Considering that the brick and mortar movie rental industry market—which as we now know
and leaders of all companies involved in the process
feared—was rapidly declining, a three-year standstill
would have imposed severe limitations on Blockbuster’s
ability to pursue a strategic transaction with Hollywood
Entertainment.370 The same would hold true for many
businesses in today’s rapidly changing global marketplace, when over a period of three years entire industries
and business can rise or fall. Implementing such a long
standstill could actually have the reverse effect of value
maximization. Using a standstill with such a long duration can deter viable and wealthy bidders from participating in a friendly process which could result in a higher bid
after confirmatory due diligence. Moreover, such a longterm standstill could cause hostile action, further risking
to disrupt a certain, but less favorable, deal already in
place.
Further, the Hollywood deal shows the potential harm
to future bidders who are not part of the original sales
process or even privy to a standstill, but enter the picture
after a definitive agreement is announced. A typical provision in a merger agreement requires that for any new
bidder to gain access to confidential information, it must
370

See source cited supra note 342.
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enter into a confidentiality agreement no less favorable to
the bidder than the one entered into between the parties
to the merger agreement. Thus, the winning bidder will
be able to use this provision as leverage or to impose an
abnormally long standstill on future offers to inhibit their
ability to make higher proposals and protect the deal at
the expense of shareholders.
While every sales process is different and often the target may need substantial protections, in most instances
the decision to use an abnormally long standstill will not
be value additive to the sales process. These standstills
are not responsive to changing market conditions or new
circumstances that arise over a relatively lengthy sales
process. Instead the term of the standstill should bear a
direct relationship to the industry in which the target operates taking into consideration possible market changes
as well as the type of sales process being used. For example, dealmakers should consider the time needed to conduct the sales process whether it is an auction, market
canvass, or a limited negotiation and the time it will take
to get to closing. To be reasonable, standstills should be
tailored to take into account these factors and should not
far exceed the estimated time to closing.
Opting for a timeframe beyond that estimate makes it
appear that the board is using the standstill for potentially nefarious means. While standstills should be strong
enough to discourage bids outside of the sales process,
they should not be used to completely prevent a bidder
from making any offer at any time. If greater protections
or incentives are needed, a myriad of other readily available deal protection devices can be used to encourage bidders to put their best bids on the table.

3. An Alternative to Highly Restrictive Standstill Terms
In lieu of using restrictive standstills, including the
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revised DADW “system” described previously, the target
and the “winning” bidder have other alternatives in the
form of deal protection devices. A definitive acquisition
agreement for a publicly traded target generally contains
a number of deal protection devices aimed at preventing
third party overbids during the pre-closing period. In negotiating these deal protection devices, the target and initial acquirer can tailor their deal protection devices so
that they specifically hinder bids being submitted by bidders who have previously executed a standstill. More
specifically, the parties could adopt a staggered termination fee such that if the target were to enter into a transaction with an over-bidder who had previously executed a
standstill, that transaction would result in a higher termination fee than would typically be paid under the
agreement.
The possibility of a higher termination fee may incentivize bidders to submit their best offers during the presigning sales process. For example, the typical termination fee in a M&A transaction is 3-4% of the deal value.371
The merger agreement between a target and a winning
bidder could contain a 3% termination fee applicable to
most termination events, including the target’s termination of the agreement to enter into an agreement with a
third party over-bidder who was not bound by a standstill.
If, however, the third party over-bidder is a party bound
by a standstill, a higher termination fee, like 5%, could be
applicable.
Dealmakers could also increase the termination fee
based on how well shopped the company was pre-signing.
371
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For example, if the target held a full public auction presigning, the termination fee applicable to third party overbidders bound by a standstill could be higher. This may
further incentivize bidders to submit their highest bids
pre-signing as a higher termination fee would be applicable to them post-signing. Moreover, the “winning” bidder
would be further assured that its deal would be protected
by virtue of the termination fee.
C. Standstills that Become Unusually Restrictive

When Combined with Other Contractual Rights: A
Backdoor Method of Limiting Stockholder Value
In addition to standstills that may be considered overly
restrictive such as DADW standstills and longer term
standstills, a seemingly less restrictive standstill could be
combined with other contractual rights to result in a
scheme detrimental to value maximization. When standstills continue to impose obligations on all parties after
one party enters into a definitive merger agreement, the
world of contractual rights among bidders and the target
substantially change, but the standstill usually does not.
This is a foreseeable event and perhaps one of the main
reasons that standstills contribute to value maximization.
Because the standstill will continue to operate to restrict
the manner in which a losing bidder may make an offer, if
an offer is allowed at all, bidders are incentivized to make
their best offers during the period when offers are freely
invited. Further, bidders know that, even if a standstill
can somehow be overcome, there is a cost to jumping a
winning deal, so most would rather be the first to sign.
However foreseeable a change in position regarding the
standstill is though, bidders will not know the extent of
this change in rights until the merger agreement is announced.
From signing onward to closing, the same level of inefficiency that Professors Bulow and Klemperer argue
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makes the auction more profitable does not necessarily
exist. 372 Of course, new bidders who have previously not
engaged in due diligence and been privy to the target’s
confidential information will still be “relatively illinformed.” But, at the same time, a potential over-bidder
benefits from knowing the price being paid by the winning
bidder, from seeing the deal embodied in the merger
agreement, and from having access to any other publicly
available information regarding the pre-existing deal. In
other words, a potential over-bidder can free-ride to a certain extent on the existing deal to make an acquisition
proposal. Those bidders who were part of the pre-signing
sales process and gained access to the target’s publicly
available information, are obviously at a greater advantage in this respect.
Of course, if all the bidders knew that the standstill
would disappear after the signing of an agreement then
all bidders would not necessarily be incentivized to submit their highest bid before signing, at least by virtue of
the standstill. There are advantages to being the first to
sign however, such as deal protection devices that would
discourage bidders from submitting uncompetitive bids.
But, for standstills to be effective pre-signing, they must
continue after a deal is signed, or else they may be ignored. Granted that a standstill needs to continue after a
deal is signed to have any integrity, it should not become
even more restrictive and made part of an impenetrable
deal protection scheme.
An excellent example of this potentially impenetrable
deal protection scheme is the Great Wolf deal.373 In that
deal, the standstills executed by the potential bidders
seemed to become DADW standstills but only after the
definitive acquisition agreement was executed. The bidders in that transaction entered the process and executed
standstills on the belief they were on a level playing field.
372
373
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However, without asking for final bids from the bidders,
Great Wolf granted Apollo exclusivity, which ultimately
led to an executed agreement between the two parties.
After the execution of the Great Wolf-Apollo agreement,
the previously executed standstills prevented the bidders
from making an offer for Great Wolf.374 Not only did the
standstills continue to restrict bidders interested in Great
Wolf, in combination with the other deal protections embodied in the Great Wolf-Apollo agreement, a standstill
waiver could not be affected.375 Thus, the standstill became, what I would dub, a Reverse DADW standstill.
Luckily for the Great Wolf shareholders however, KSL
who was uninhibited by a standstill, created the opportunity for a more fair and open sales process and thereby
increased shareholder wealth by 157%.376
But, the other bidders were unable to participate when
KSL entered the picture because of the transformation of
the standstill into a Reverse DADW standstill.
A Delaware court is not likely to find such a Reverse
DADW Standstill to be valid using either Vice Chancellor
Laster’s or Chancellor Strine’s reasoning.
Applying
Chancellor Strine’s reasoning from Ancestry.com, the provision was not used as a “gavel” with the goal of value
maximization.377
Based on the facts as extracted from SEC filings, Great
Wolf does not appear to have run an auction during which
bidders were asked to make final bids and were told in
advance of the auction ending.378 Because of this, the
bidders may have been operating under the assumption
they could request a waiver if need be. Instead of using
the standstill as a means of extracting greater value by

See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text.
376 See supra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.
377 In re Ancestry.com, C.A. No. 7988-CS, at 23.
378 See supra notes 292-99 and accompanying text.
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instructing bidders to submit their best and final offers
for possible deal protection in the resulting agreement,
Great Wolf appears to have used the standstills as a form
of deal protection device which favored Apollo. Under Ancestry.com, this is potentially even more problematic than
using a DADW standstill whereby bidders would be made
aware of the consequences.
Not only would these Reverse DADW standstills not
carry weight under Strine’s reasoning but also a court applying Vice Chancellor Laster’s reasoning would likely
find that a target’s use of such a combination would result
in an informational vacuum.379 The bidders previously
bound by the standstills would not be able to make a bid
and the target board, like the Great Wolf board, would not
be able to waive the standstill provision to consider potentially higher bids. The end result then places the board in
an informational vacuum when making its recommendation regarding the contemplated transaction. Thus, the
Reverse DADW standstill combination like the DADW
standstill would likely be invalid in Laster’s view.
In cases like Great Wolf, what starts out as a necessary
prelude for the protection of the target and the facilitation
of an exchange of confidential information can turn into a
value-maximization deterrent for the target, and a powerful deal protection device for the first party that obtains a
signed agreement. Standstills customarily are used to deter hostile bids or control the auction process and prevent
a bidder from buying the target at a bargain price. When
standstills are combined with other contractual provisions
to preempt the auction process and prevent interested
buyers from any further participation in the sales process,
standstills can become an impediment to value maximization. Reminiscent of the methods used by the mafia to
“eliminate the competition,” basic supply and demand dictates that the result will allow a bidder to buy the target
at a bargain price.
379
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CONCLUSION
Standstills, the M&A equivalents of a “school-yard
time-out,” have become standard features of the public
company sales process. Despite the prevalence of standstills, the courts and academics alike, have not fully addressed the role of standstills in the sales process or
whether they aid in maximizing stockholder value. Auction theorists agree that a significant factor in any M&A
sale process is the presence of asymmetric information.
In most auctions, standstills allow the target to control
the process by keeping bidders uninformed of each other’s
bids and ensuring that no bidder with preempt the process while giving bidders access to its proprietary information, assuring bidders of their valuation. Thus, standstills help to enhance the sales process by selectively controlling information releases to encourage higher bids. As
such, standstills at least aid in providing a floor for the
valuation of the target. In doing so, standstills help to
keep bidders friendly.
At the same, however, when standstills are enhanced
to provide greater restrictions on the sales process or perform functions after the execution of a definitive agreement with a “winning” bidder, there is a risk these restrictions could have detrimental effects on value maximization. This Article uses auction theory to provide a
framework pursuant to which more restrictive standstill
provisions, like DADW standstills, may be used legitimately under certain circumstances to extract value from
bidders. This framework takes into account several factors including that such restrictive standstills only be
used pursuant to a thorough shopping process in which all
bidders are informed that they may never have another
bite at the apple. Moreover, this frameworks provides
that such standstills be paired with a minimal fiduciary
out based on intervening events that carried a slightly increased termination fee. Other forms of restrictive standstills, such as standstills with long durations or reverse
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DADW standstills, should be declared invalid. As an alternative to restrictive standstills, this Article also suggests using a staggered termination fee that can better
achieve value maximization with less risk. In adopting
the framework set forth in this Article, dealmakers would
strike a balance between keeping bidders from becoming
foes to the “winning” bidder while at the same time encouraging the maximization of stockholder value.

